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This dissertation consists of two independent essays that have the same ultimate goal:
to influence consumers to make decisions that are aligned with the objectives of a business
or policy maker. In the following two sections, we introduce the real-world context, goals,
analytical methods, and main contributions of each essay.
1.1 Scheduling Advertising on Television
A major source of revenue for any cable television network is the placement of ad-
vertisements, or spots, within its programming. The contracts between the advertisers and
the network require that the network delivers an expected number of views from a targeted
demographic during the course of the advertising campaign. This is called the target view-
ership. These contracts also specify the number of spot-seconds used to deliver the required
number of impression. The network must deliver the contracted number of spot-seconds
even if the target viewership has already been achieved. Advertisers also require the network
to deliver the target demographic viewership according to an agreed-upon pace during the
course of the campaign.
A contract between the advertiser and the network is referred to as a deal. In a deal,
the advertiser also places constraints on scheduling spots, which could include requirements
that spots must air on a specified day of the week or at a specified time of day. Constraints
can also require that spots are shown during specific programs or requires that spots air in
the first or last position of the commercial break. On the other hand, the network typically
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sets aside a certain amount of time every hour for airing spots. The network also aims to
maintain the right balance between content and spots so as to retain audience engagement.
The finite supply of air time available in which the network can air spots is referred
to as the available inventory. From the network’s perspective, in order to make the most
effective use of their limited inventory, spots must be scheduled within a time slot that meets
the following goals: The first goal of the network is to deliver viewership from the target
demographic requested by the advertiser, and delivers this viewership at the required pace.
This viewership must not exceed the number of impressions requested by the advertiser,
because impressions beyond the contracted quantity do not generate additional revenue.
The second goal is to minimize the viewership from any demographic outside the targeted
demographic, since these impressions are not monetized.
The projections for national viewership accepted by networks and advertisers are those
issued by Nielsen Holdings N.V., referred to as Nielsen ratings. These ratings are published
a few days after programs are broadcast. Therefore, one sub-task of a network is to forecast
viewership based on ratings data from the past and schedule spots using the forecast so the
two goals defined above are met. The quality of the schedule obviously dependents on the
quality of the forecast.
In Chapter 2, we develop a theoretically based framework for solving the spots
scheduling problem described above. This scheduling is achieved in three stages. We start
in Stage 1 with a multi-day optimization model that takes the aggregate demand for spots
as input to generate weights for the deals in play. These weights indicate the relative im-
portance of deals after taking into account the number of impressions that remain to be
delivered for the deal during the remaining lifetime of the campaign. These weights are fed
into in a single-day optimization model that assigns spots to breaks so as to make the best
use of the viewership, given the existing inventory and the available spots. This optimization
is performed to deliver a higher share of impressions to deals that have larger weights.
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For computational efficiency, we split the single-day optimization model that sched-
ules spots in breaks into two stages. In Stage 2, the spots are allocated to the breaks. Then,
the precise positioning of the allocated spots within each break is completed in Stage 3. To
forecast ratings, we developed a time series model that takes advantage of the correlation
between the ratings of breaks to protect against uncertainty. In Chapter 2, we provide struc-
tural results that justify the use of a point forecast instead of a more sophisticated approach,
such as stochastic programming or robust optimization. The framework is packaged in a
decision support system that is used by leading television networks in the United States
and in India, and it has produced an increase in revenue of 3% to 5%, which translates to
approximately $60 million annually for one of the larger users.
1.2 Peer Effects In The Diffusion Of Solar Panels: A Dynamic
Discrete Choice Approach
Installations of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United States have overgrown
in the last few years, mainly credited to federal, state, and local level incentives. The federal
government established a 30% federal investment tax credit (ITC) in 2006 that runs until
this year, 2019, and then it is scheduled to decline. State support for PV diffusion is also in
a downturn. The most ambitious state policies, the California Solar Initiative, is already in
its last phase and only available through municipal service providers. Simultaneously, lower
electricity prices in several parts of the United States due to low natural gas prices have
further pressured the continued penetration of PV.
On the other hand, PV installation costs have come down dramatically: Average
residential prices were under $5 per watt in 2013 compared to $10 per watt in 2007. How do
these price and incentive dynamics impact the diffusion of PV? In particular, amidst these
shifts, how should electric utilities rethink their solar programs under budgetary constraints?
A better understanding of these issues may be used to design solar programs that are tailored
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to target specific segments of the population.
To address these questions, we studied the Austin, Texas, residential PV market in
Chapter 3 leveraging a rich data set that includes each household demographics, property
characteristics, and electricity consumption. We joined that data with the adopters PV
installation period, installation cost, rebate received, and system attributes. We developed
a dynamic discrete choice (DDC) model that permits the exploration of the effects of policy
and market shifts on the diffusion of PV. Accurately, our model characterizes the factors
in PV diffusion at a consumer disaggregated level modeling households as consumers who
are looking forward: At every period, each household who has not adopted yet compares
the decision of adopting today versus waiting and deciding in the next period. In dynamic
programming terminology, we formulated the household decision of adoption as an optimal
stopping problem.
The factors that enter into consideration in the utility function of each household are
the net present value of installing a PV (which includes the cost of installation, the local
rebate, the ITC, and the savings from PV electricity generation) plus the awareness of the
technology that the household gained from neighbors who installed a PV previously, the
peer effects. For estimation of the structural parameters that govern behavior, we designed
and implemented a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method that allows us to handle
heterogeneity in a dynamic context. Because the model is structural—in the sense that the
parameters capture the preferences of the households and quantifies the spatial peer effects—
we can project the dynamics of the market and do counterfactual analysis, thereby, giving
insights about what rebate schedules are more efficient for accelerating the diffusion process.
The value of the estimated parameters shows that wealthy households are more keen
to install a PV and that the peer effects are significant and play an essential role in the
decision of adoption. Moreover, the marginal effect of a new neighbor adopter is higher
for households that are rural, then suburban and finally urban. Furthermore, unobserved
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consumer heterogeneity is considerable as measured by the standard deviation of the random
effects that capture the heterogeneity.
For validation, we benchmarked our model against the classic Bass model comparing
the predicted number of adopters per quarter in a two-year test set. Our DDC model out-
perform the Bass model on MAPE by order of magnitude on the test set. For counterfactual
policy analysis, we assumed the hypothetical situation that the government could adjust
the rebate every quarter to match a pre-announced net cost of installation. We created the
following net cost scenarios over time: observed net cost as the base case; constant net cost;
stepwise decreasing net cost; and stepwise increasing net cost. Subsequently, we predicted
the number of adopters and computed the budget spent on rebates under each scenario.
Constant and decreasing net cost of installation are Pareto superior to the base case in the
sense that these scenarios incentivize more adopters at a lower total budget spent than the
base case. An increasing net cost incentivizes many more adopters than the base case but at
higher total budget spent. By using our framework, a policymaker can measure what would
be the effect of different rebate schedules and adjust it according to her objective.
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Chapter 2
Scheduling Advertising on Television
2.1 Introduction
A major source of revenue for any cable television network is the placement of ad-
vertisements, or spots, within its programming. The contracts between the advertisers and
the network require that the network delivers a target viewership—specifically, a number of
impressions of a particular demographic during the course of the advertising campaign. The
demographics that advertisers seek are defined according to two dimensions: gender and age
group. For example, M18-34 refers to males between the ages of 18 and 34, F18-34 refers
to females between the ages of 18 and 34, and P18-34 refers to persons (males and female)
between the ages of 18 and 34. The contracts also specify the number of spot-seconds used
to deliver the required number of impressions. The contracted number of spot-seconds must
be delivered even if the target viewership has already been achieved. Advertisers also require
the network to deliver the target demographic viewership according to an agreed upon pace
during the course of the campaign. The contract between the advertiser and the network
is referred to as a deal. The particular type of deal described here is referred to as guar-
anteed deal because the number of spots must be telecast and the target viewership must
be achieved as promised. In addition, the advertiser places constraints on scheduling spots,
which could include requirements that spots must air at a specified day of the week and
time of day, requirements that spots are shown during specific programs, or requirements
that spots air in the first or last position of the commercial break. These guaranteed deals
comprise most of the revenue for a typical North American cable network. There are also
deals that are not guaranteed. For these types of deals, the network is allowed to decide
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whether to schedule the spots, and no viewership targets are required. In this case, the
advertiser pays the network on a per–telecast spot basis.
The network typically sets aside a certain amount of time every hour for airing spots.
The network also aims to maintain the right balance between content and spots so as to retain
audience engagement. The finite supply of air time available for the network to air spots
is referred to as the available inventory. From the network’s perspective, in order to make
the most effective use of their limited amount of inventory, spots must be scheduled within
a time slot so that the following goals are met: (i) The viewership is delivered in the target
demographic requested by the corresponding advertiser at the required pace, which is the
rate at which spots must be scheduled (e.g., the number of spots per day). In addition, the
viewership must not exceed the number of impressions requested by the advertiser, because
impressions beyond the contracted quantity do not generate additional revenue. And, (ii)
the viewership that is delivered in any demographic outside the target must be minimal, as
these impressions are also not monetized.
The inventory is further segmented into short time intervals, or commercial breaks
(15 seconds to few minutes), that are distributed across many programs scheduled to air.
The viewership for the break usually depends on the program containing the break, the
time of day, and the day of the week. The projections for national viewership accepted by
networks and advertisers are those issued by Nielsen Holdings N.V., referred to as Nielsen
ratings. These ratings are published a few days after programs are broadcast. Therefore,
one sub-task is to forecast the viewership based on ratings data from the past and schedule
spots using the forecast so that the goals defined above are met. The quality of the schedule
is obviously dependent on the quality of the forecast.
For each day, the qualifying spots are scheduled to air within the breaks to produce
a log, or a 24–hour (one-day) schedule with programs interspersed among the breaks that
contain spots. To schedule these effectively, the decision-maker must consider several other
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factors in addition to the scheduling constraints requested by the advertiser. At any given
point in time, each deal has already delivered some of the target impressions and has a
specific number of spots to run, a number of impressions to deliver, and a number of days
remaining until completion. Some deals may exceed the required pace (i.e., they are over-
performing) and some may fall below the required pace (i.e., they are under-performing).
The network’s ability to correct any mismatch will depend on the time remaining on the
deal. The advertiser pays only for the contracted number of impressions: Any impressions
beyond this number would be a service that the network has given away, and any shortfall of
impressions requires the network to pay a penalty, either in the form of additional spots or
in cash. Therefore, it is important for the network to ensure that the deals track as closely
as possible to the required number of impressions.
In this essay, we developed a framework that is theoretically grounded for solving the
spots scheduling problem described above. The approach is bundled in an advertisement
revenue management support system, that is used by leading television networks in the
United States and India producing increase in revenue of 3% to 5%, that translate in about
$60M annually for one of the bigger users. The scheduling is achieved in three stages. We
start in Stage 1 with a multi-day optimization model that takes the aggregate demand for
spots as input to generate weights for the deals in play. These weights indicate the relative
importance of deals after taking into account the number of impressions still due to be
delivered for the deal during the remaining lifetime of the campaign. The more the deal
is lacking in the required pacing (i.e., the more significant amount of impressions pending
relative to the time left on the deal) the higher is the weight of the deal. These weights
fed into in a single-day optimization model that assigns spots to breaks so as to make the
best use of the viewership, given the existing inventory and the available spots. This is
done so as to deliver a higher share of the impressions to the deals with larger weights. For
computational efficiency, we split the single-day optimization model that schedules spots in
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breaks in two stages. In Stage 2, the spots are allocated to the breaks. Then, the precise
positioning of the allocated spots within each break is completed in Stage 3. This approach
generates a schedule for one day at a time, preferably at the latest possible point in time
so that the layout of programs and commercial breaks (i.e., time and durations) as well
as the set of spots available to be scheduled are as close as possible to the final version.
Delaying the scheduling until the latest possible point in time has the additional benefit of
generating the best possible forecast for viewership ratings. These models are supported by
a ratings forecasting model that takes advantage of the correlation between ratings of breaks
to protect against uncertainty. We implemented classic time series techniques to forecast
ratings, and provide structural results that justify the use of a point forecast instead of a
more sophisticated approach, such as stochastic programming or robust optimization.
We focus on describing the solution approach and the mathematical modeling. This
description includes several modeling ideas and features that can guide similar efforts. We
also touch upon several practical and business considerations and describe how these are
managed in practice. As with any implementation, one measure of success is the potential
for increase in revenue. In this regard, this application, which is being used daily at leading
networks, provides an increase in revenue of the magnitude of tens of millions dollars annually.
Another measure of success is whether the application has led to more problems for analysis
and solution. In that respect, several new problems are identified and are currently being
solved to improve both the quality of the solutions as well as the analysis of the results for
use in the ad-sales process.
The organization of the essay is as follows: Section 2.2 describes the related academic
literature. Section 2.3 gives an overview of the problem and the solution approach and
presents our structural results that supports the use of ratings point forecast. Section 2.4
details the optimization models. Section 2.5 specifies the solution strategy. Section 2.6
describes the statistical models used to forecast the ratings. Section 3.6 presents numerical
9
results, and Section 3.8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Advertising in television is a multi-billion dollar industry in which revenue manage-
ment (RM) techniques can have a considerable effect on the bottom line. Despite this, as
[75] detail, only a few RM studies in the television industry had been documented in the
operations literature until 2005. However, in recent years there has been a growing inter-
est; see survey by Pandey et al. [50]. For a full description of the television industry, see
Blumenthal and Goodenough [9]. The cable network business processes can be grouped
into four sub-processes: Planning of creative goods (see, for example, Caves and Guo [19]),
Scheduling shows (Headen et al. [37], Reddy et al. [58], Rust et al. [63], Wilbur et al. [84],
etc.), Inventory sales and Spots scheduling. Our work is most closely related to the last two
as discussed below.
The sales of audience inventory occurs in two periods (Phillips and Young [52]), the
upfront market and the scatter market (forward and spot markets in finance parlance). The
upfront market takes place approximately four months before the broadcast season, when
the networks publicize the shows schedule. At this time, the advertisers buy ratings points
that are guaranteed. All the remaining inventory that is unsold during the upfront mar-
ket (about 20%–40%), is sold on the scatter market during the broadcasting season. To
sell inventory during the upfront market, it is necessary to have projections of the ratings
inventory and the advertisers demand. Bollapragada et al. [12] developed a decision sup-
port system based on integer programming and heuristics to support the sales process at
the NBC’s television network. Subsequent work has been reported on advertiser demand
forecasting (Bollapragada et al. [14]) and how much inventory to sell on each market period
(Bollapragada and Mallik [11], Kimms and Muller-Bungart [44], Zhang [85]). Araman and
Popescu [4] define the allocation problem of stochastic ratings between upfront and scatter
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markets as the media revenue management or capacity planning problem, and formulate it
as a random yield multiple lot-sizing in a production to order system (Grosfeld-Nir and Ger-
chak [36]); the authors obtain structural results that define the optimal capacity allocation
depending on the contract parameters, audience, and time. Carbajal and Chaar [18] imple-
mented an integer programming approach to solve this problem at a major U.S. television
network. Using a different approach, Banciu et al. [6] examine network bundling strategies
to sell to advertisers. These bundles can be composed of different demographic audiences
or air times. In this essay, take the sales as given and only concern ourselves with the day
to day scheduling to fulfill the sale commitments. Once the content (i.e., the programming)
is acquired and scheduled, and after the deals have been signed for spots, the spots must
be scheduled at the right times to make the most effective use of air time. This essay deals
with this process. The first paper on this topic is Bollapragada et al. [13], who solve the
scheduling problem of programming a given set of commercials of the same duration that
should be aired a pre-specified number of times as uniformly as possible with respect to
break position. The authors formulate the model as a network flow problem with a non-
linear loss objective function, and they construct ad-hoc heuristics that can produce good
solutions for test instances. For the same problem and test instances, Brusco [16] improves
the solution time and optimality gap using a specialized branch and bound procedure and
a simulated annealing heuristic, and also tests alternative loss functions. Brusco and Singh
[17] incorporate time separability conditions and the possibility of having spots of different
durations. Bollapragada and Garbiras [10] developed heuristic methods for scheduling spots
in breaks using an integer programming model with real world conditions such as advertisers
preferences for specific positions within the break. This system is used by NBC. Gaur et al.
[30] extend the previous model by adding flexibility to model commercial conflicts and by
developing a specialized algorithm. Zhang [85], as a second step, proposes a quadratic inte-
ger program to minimize the deviations from the original schedule generated in the previous
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process of inventory sales. Their formulation is a simplification of the real world problem
and it is separated by shows, which results in one small problem per show that is easy to
solve. This essay differs from the previous cited literature in that we developed a detailed
spots schedule to minimize the penalty of under delivery, while honoring a myriad of cons-
traints. Our work does not separate per show; we can move spots from one show to another.
In fact, several constraints apply for the entire day (and some across days); therefore, the
scheduling problem is complex. A related problem is scheduling spots for live television, in
which the length of the breaks are uncertain, so the decision to air spots must be made in
real time (Popescu and Crama [53]). The problem that we deal with in this essay is within
cable television, where the length of the breaks are known at the moment of scheduling.
In the following section, we present the mathematical model, solution approach and
structural results that support the use of point forecast ratings as input for the optimization.
2.3 Problem and Description of Solution Approach
The television spots scheduling problem can be mathematically formulated as a multi-
stage stochastic programming model where the uncertainty is on future ratings. The time
horizon is t = 1, . . . , T days and there is a countable finite set S of scenarios. The probability
of scenario s ∈ S is ps, such that
∑
s p
s = 1. The scenarios are connected in a tree where
the consecutive stages of the tree are the days and at the last stage (i.e., stage T ) there are
|S| leaves; each leaf corresponding to one scenario. Furthermore, in each stage t there are
N(t) set of nodes; such that, for each node n ∈ N(t), the set Ω(n) ⊆ S are the scenarios
that pass through node n. Because this is a tree, every scenario belongs to one and only one
node at each stage (i.e., Ω(n)∩Ω(n′) = ∅, for all n 6= n′ ∈ N(t), and
⋃
n∈N(t) Ω(n) = S for all
t = 1, . . . T ). For modeling purposes, the root node of the tree is at stage 0, so that in stage
t = 1 there are N(1) nodes. Specific to spots scheduling problem, the set of breaks that will
air per day, B, and the set of deals, D, are provided. The viewership is segmented in the set
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Q of demographics. For notional convenience through the essay, let indexes b ∈ B, d ∈ D
and q ∈ Q. The time length of break b is Lb, and the length of a spot of deal d is Hd. Each
deal d has a target demographic. Let the binary parameter Gdq be equal to 1 if deal d targets
demo q and 0 if not. Furthermore, each deal d has a contracted number of impressions to be
delivered, Id. The cost per thousand impressions of demographic q is CPMq. The rating of







qb, for all d ∈ D; b ∈ B; t = 1, . . . , T and s ∈ S. The decisions variables are
the following: xstdb, the number of spots of deal d to schedule in break b of day t in scenario
s; and ysd, the total number of shortfall impression of deal d in scenario s. The optimization





















d ≥ Id ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D, (2.2)
xts ∈ A(t) ∀ s ∈ S, t = 1, . . . T, (2.3)
xts = xts
′ ∀ s 6= s′ ∈ Ω(n), n ∈ Nt, t = 1, . . . , T, (2.4)
xtsdb ∈ Z≥0, ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D, b ∈ B, t = 1, . . . , T, (2.5)
ysd ∈ Z≥0, ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D. (2.6)
Constraint (2.1) restricts the maximum slots-time allocated to each break; constraint
(2.2) ensures that each deal gets assigned the contracted number of impressions minus the
shortfall. Constraint (2.3) restricts the schedule in each day t to the set A(t), that are linear
restrictions which can theoretically restrict to schedulable assignments (specific constraints
are provided in Section 2.4). Constraint (2.4) are the nonanticipativity constraints. And
constraints 2.5 and 2.6 are the integer non negative nature of variables.
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This general problem of assigning spots to exact positions is very challenging compu-
tationally and fraught with practical difficulties of incomplete information and uncertainty.
In any given day multiple deals compete for spots in the schedule. Some deals have been
running for a long time and have either been under-performing or over-performing. Some
deals are due to end soon (i.e., next week) whereas some will not expire for some time (i.e.,
this quarter). Furthermore, the creative work for the spots are not ready until the day prior
to airing and therefore their relative lengths, specific requirements as well as their restrictions
are unknown for future schedules. Finally, the ratings of programs are not known. Forecasts
of ratings are imprecise and become less precise with increasing time lengths.
2.3.1 Solution Approach
Solving the large program is impossible given today’s state of the art machines and
software. Instead we chose to focus on the day-to-day scheduling problem. Even that
problem is broken into three stages due to running time considerations. Figure 2.1 shows
the schematic processes and information flow. The sequence adopted is as follows:
Stage 1: Estimate Deal Weights. Every week, the model is solved to determine the
relative weights for deals. The inputs to this model are (i) all the contractual details of the
deals for which spots are under consideration for inclusion in the coming week, (ii) how the
deals have performed relative to their target audience, (iii) the number of weeks remaining
in the deals, and (iv) information regarding spots yet to be scheduled for each deal. The
output from this stage comprises the deal weights that are used in the next two stages to
produce the daily schedule. The deal weight reflects the relative price per impression given
to the deal in the desired demographic.
Stage 2: Schedule Spots in Breaks. The network keeps fine-tuning the details of the
schedule showing the minute-by-minute airing of shows, advertisements and promotions, or
logs, until nearly the evening prior to airing the schedule. These initial logs are created
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manually based on expert opinion and provide a feasible schedule that finally is optimized.
The decision to continue the practice of manually scheduling the log is made based on several
considerations. The management typically does not want the entire schedule to be managed
by a machine. The schedulers prefer to decide which spots to air and whether to give favored
slots to certain deals. Moreover, the log is developed several weeks prior to airing. In the
initial versions, the log is quite incomplete and filled with generic information or placeholders
that become more specific as the date of airing approaches. Therefore, it is practical to allow
the schedulers to develop the log gradually and deliver it for optimization at the final step.
The log is downloaded from the production system on to the optimization server. Several
pre-checks are performed to determine data accuracy as well as automatic detection of rule
violations by schedulers who may occasionally relax rules to satisfy a client requirement or
make a human decision to override the constraint. These violations are frozen in the final
schedule. The initial schedule as well as the final schedule produced by the optimization are
vetted by a traffic system. This system has a scheduling engine which automatically checks
most of the rules imposed by the network and, more importantly, checks the rules imposed by
government regulators. Therefore, the initial feasibility is guaranteed unless the scheduler
has revised the schedule and has overridden the scheduling engine. This “close-to-final”
schedule is optimized in Stage 2 to assign spots to breaks.
Stage 3: Arrange Spots in Break Positions. This model arranges the spots inside the
breaks to which they are assigned in the previous stage. To the user, Stages 2 and 3 happen
simultaneously and are not visible as separate steps. Afterward, the optimized schedule
is pushed back into the log of the network using integration software. The traffic system
verifies the schedule suggested by the optimizer. The human scheduler may make further
changes until he or she is satisfied and then pushes the schedule to the production system.
The production system sends the schedule for broadcast. The spots are only one component
of what is finally aired. The actual programs, the creative for the spots, the promotional
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advertisements for the network’s own programs, the local TV station content, and the local
advertisements are all assembled before reaching the subscriber.
The resulting schedule and revenue gains are scrutinized on a regular basis. The
metrics of performance are both quantitative and qualitative. The evaluation frequencies
are daily, weekly, and monthly. Some sample metrics are:
• The revenue difference between the original schedule and the optimized schedule helps
measure the lift in advertisement revenue once the actual ratings are obtained. The
accounting is straightforward and the details are omitted.
• Other metrics are used, such as the distribution of spots of an advertiser or an agency
by time, the day-to-day performance of deals, the use of prime time spots, the analysis
of the source of revenue lift, and the forecast performance.
The management of the performance of deals to monitor the quality of the schedule
is termed stewardship. The stewardship team uses the above information to analyze the
effects of deal positions and the effects of the number of spots released for production on
deal performance. The knowledge gained is used to fine-tune Stages 1 and 2. For example,
the network may add additional spots to improve the condition of the deal, optimization
can increase weights on these deals to improve delivery, or more prime time spots can be
reserved for these deals.
The three optimization stages use as input the point forecast of ratings. Alternatively,
it is possible to include the ratings uncertainty in the optimization models by using, for ex-
ample, stochastic programming or robust optimization. In the following section, we establish
structural results that justify this choice (of point forecasts) and demonstrate that there is
negligible revenue loss in the long term if certain mild conditions are met. Moreover, in
Section 2.6.1, we discover structural properties of the correlation between break ratings that
allow us to reduce the size of the scheduling problem considerably and deal with uncertainty.
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Figure 2.1: Processes and information flow.
2.3.2 Structural Results: Validity of Using Point Forecast
We start with a simplified version of the spot scheduling problem. The time horizon
is one week, for which the set of breaks that will air, B, and the set of deals, D, are provided.
The viewership is segmented in demographics, Q. Each deal d ∈ D has a target demographic,
which is identified by the binary parameter Gdq, for all q ∈ Q. The parameter is equal to
1 if deal d targets demo q and 0 if not. Furthermore, each deal has a contracted number
of impressions to be delivered, Id. The cost per thousand impressions of demographic q is
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CPMq. The length of break b is Lb, and the length of a spot of deal d is Hd. The ratings
in break b of demo q is a random variable, Rqb, which takes values in a set of scenarios S
(we use scenarios for the construction of the proofs of Lemma 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, which
we further generalize for proof of Lemma 2.3.4). For each demo q in break b the ratings







qb, for all d ∈ D, b ∈ B, s ∈ S. The decisions variables are the number of
spots of deal d to schedule in break b ∈ B, xdb, and the number of shortfall impression of

















d ≥ Id ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D, (πsd) (2.8)
xdb ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B,
ysd ≥ 0 ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D.
The following lemmas allow us to estimate the impact of using the mean instead of
the random ratings.
Lemma 2.3.1. Replacing the random ratings rsdb by their mean r̄qb produces a lower bound
of the value of the objective function of problem (P ).
To prove the lemma, notice that problem (P) is always feasible. Let µb and π
s
d be the






















d ≤ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B, (xdb) (2.9)
πsd ≤ CPMd ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D, (ysd) (2.10)
µb ≤ 0 ∀ b ∈ B,
πsd ≥ 0 ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D.
Let µ∗b , π
s∗
d be the optimal solution of problem (D), and z
∗
D be the optimal objective
function. By the Strong Duality Theorem, z∗P = z
∗
D. By the complementary slackness
conditions, x∗db, y
s∗




d optimal solution of the dual,


























x∗db = 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B,
(πs∗d − CPMd) y∗sd = 0 ∀ s ∈ S, d ∈ D.
Using the mean of ratings (r̄qb =
∑
s∈S p








Hdx̄db ≤ Lb ∀ b ∈ B, (µ̄b) (2.11)∑
b∈B
r̄dbx̄db + ȳd ≥ Id ∀ d ∈ D, (π̄d) (2.12)
ȳd, x̄db ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B.
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The decision variables under the mean of ratings are x̄db, number of deal d’s spots to
schedule in break b, for all d ∈ D and b ∈ B; and ȳdb, the number of shortfall impression of




d be the optimal solution of problem (P̄), and z̄
∗
P be the optimal objective








subject to Hdµ̄b + r̄dbπ̄d ≤ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B, (x̄db) (2.13)
π̄d ≤ CPMd ∀ d ∈ D, (ȳd) (2.14)
µ̄b ≤ 0 ∀ b ∈ B,
π̄d ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D.
Let µ̄∗b , π̄
∗
d be the optimal solution of (D̄), and z̄
∗
D be the optimal objective function.
By the Strong Duality Theorem, z̄∗P = z̄
∗
D. By the complementary slackness conditions,
x̄∗db, ȳ
∗




























db = 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B,
(π̄∗d − CPMd) ȳ∗d = 0 ∀ d ∈ D.
Using the previous results, the proof of Lemma 2.3.1 is straightforward:
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. The optimal solution of problem (D̄) is feasible for problem (D).
Therefore, z̄∗D ≤ z∗D, and then z̄∗P ≤ z∗P .
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Lemma 2.3.2. If there is a shortfall in every scenario for every deal, then the solution found
in Lemma 2.3.1 is optimal to problem (P).
Proof. A shortfall in every scenario implies that ysd > 0, for all s ∈ S, d ∈ D, for every feasible
solution, in particular the optimal solution ys∗d > 0. Then, because of the complementary















, for all b ∈ B. The same solution is obtained for problem (D̄). There-
fore, the optimal solution of problem (P̄) is also optimal for the original problem (P).
Lemma 2.3.3. If there is never a shortfall in any scenario, then the solution found in
Lemma 2.3.1 is optimal to problem (P).
Proof. If there is never a shortfall, ys∗d = ȳ
∗
d = 0 for all s ∈ S, d ∈ D; therefore, the optimal
objective function of both (P) and (P̄) are equal to 0.
Next, consider the case when there is neither zero shortfall or positive shortfall in all
scenarios. Assume in each week the scheduling problem is solved for the deals that run for
the next K weeks. Let us analyze the generalization of the random ratings such that instead
of having a discrete set of scenarios S, and the associated ratings rskdb , for k = 1, . . . , K, it is
given a stochastic process Rkdb that satisfies Assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1. The ratings stochastic process {Rkdb : 1 ≤ k} is a stationary ergodic
process; i.e, its mean and other moments do not change over time and its statistical properties
can be inferred from a single sufficiently large random sample.
In this case, the shortfall variables are stochastic decision variables denoted as Y kd ,
k = 1, . . . , K; d ∈ D.
Lemma 2.3.4. The expected value of the weekly average of the optimal solution when solved
for K weeks at a time converges to the one week solution found by replacing the random
ratings by their means as K becomes large.
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Proof. Every week the problem is solved for the deals that run for the nextK weeks. Consider
the generalization of the random ratings that instead of having a discrete set of scenarios
S, and the associated ratings rskdb , for k = 1, . . . , K, it is given a stochastic process R
k
db
under general distribution, and the stochastic variable Y kd exits. The associated (nonlinear)



























≥ KId ∀ d ∈ D,
xkdb ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B; k = 1, . . . , K
Y kd ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D; k = 1, . . . , K,
where E is the expectation operator. Let’s restrict the problem to use the same variables for
every week, that is xkdb = xdb , and Y
k



















≥ KId ∀ d ∈ D,
xdb ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B,
Yd ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D,
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xdb + Yd ≥ Id ∀ d ∈ D, (2.16)
xdb ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B,
Yd ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D.








Hdxdb ≤ Lb ∀ b ∈ B,∑
b∈B
r̄dbxdb + yd ≥ Id d ∈ D,
xdb ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D, b ∈ B,
yd ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ D.





Rkdb + ε(K) = r̄db
where ε(K)→ 0 as K →∞.
Let V ∗(K), V ∗const(K) and V ∗det(K) be the optimal solutions of problems P ′(K),
P const(K) and P det(K) respectively. Then
V ∗det(K) ≤ V ∗(K) ≤ V ∗const(K) (2.17)
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The first inequality comes from Lemma 2.3.1 and Assumption 1. The second inequality
comes from the fact that the Pconst(K) is a restricted version of P’(K).
Let Hmax := max
d∈D













Let x∗detdb , y
∗det
d be the optimal solution to the deterministic problem P
det(K). Plug in

















d +Mε(K) ≥ Id ∀d ∈ D.
Replacing in (2.17), we obtain




therefore, V ∗(K)→ V ∗det(K) as ε(K)→ 0.
Accordingly, using the mean of the ratings in the scheduling problem produces a
nearly optimal solution if a sufficient number of weeks are optimized at a time and deals
run for many weeks. The proofs of Lemmas 1 to 3 are completed by using the primal-
dual technique described in [64] of two-stage stochastic programming problems with discrete
distributions. Lemma 4 is somewhat new in using more general assumptions compared to the
ones found in the literature as well as in the proof technique. Based on the above lemmas,
we use the ratings point forecast estimate.
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Table 2.1: Small schedule example.
(a) Ratings forecast per break and demographic (b) Targeted demo and weight per advertiser
Impressions P6-10 F21-30 M21-30
Break 1 100 300 200
Break 2 200 100 300
Break 3 300 200 100




(c) Original Schedule (d) Optimized Schedule
Y P6-10 F21-30 M21-30
Break 1 A3 (3× 200)
Break 2 A1 (1× 200)
Break 3 A2 (2× 200)
Total 1200
X P6-10 F21-30 M21-30
Break 1 A2 (2× 300)
Break 2 A3 (3× 300)
Break 3 A1 (1× 300)
Total 1800 (Lift ∆ = 600)
Note. A spots schedule corresponds to an allocation of spots (advertisements) of different brands to com-
mercial breaks, which are presented in between television shows. Viewers are segmented in demographics
and each advertiser targets a specific demographic. In this small example, there are only three breaks, three
demographics and three advertisers. Panel (a) displays the forecasted ratings per each demographic on each
break. Panel (b) presents the advertiser, their targeted demographic and the weight or importance of each
advertiser for the network. Panel (c) is the original schedule, or log, that the network prepares with a
heuristic system and provides for optimization. Panel (d) is the post optimized schedule that maximizes the
forecasted targeted audience per advertiser multiplied by the corresponding weight. A1 is moved from break
2 to break 3, A2 is moved from break 3 to break 1, and A3 is moved from break 1 to break 2. Unfortunately,
such simple moves are not possible due to the many constraints that should be satisfied. However, the real
moves that optimize a schedule exhibit chain-like patterns as described in section 2.7.3.
2.4 Three Stages for Scheduling Spots
As discussed in Section 2.3, we carry out the daily scheduling of spots into breaks, and
positions within breaks, in three stages. In this section, we provide definitions of variables
and describe the models of each stage. For easy reference, we present summary tables of
the sets and parameters used in each model. Some of the notation is used in more than
one stage. To fix ideas, we present a self-explanatory example in Table 2.1 that depicts the
overall approach.
2.4.1 Stage 1: Estimate Deal Weights
Stage 1 answers the following question:
What is the the relative importance of each deal according to: (a) the remaining target
demographic impressions of each deal; and (b) the value of these target demographics?
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The first stage estimates this importance that we denote as deal’s weight. The de-
mographic CPM is the cost of reaching 1,000 viewers belonging to the specified audience
demographic, a standard measure used by the television industry. This model is solved at
the beginning of every week to define each open deal’s relative importance, or weight, with
respect to other open deals. Basically, the model creates a tentative arrangement of spots
into breaks for the next week. The arrangement of spots is tentative because the length of
all the video spots are not known, some of the advertiser constraints for the complete week
may be not defined, and the timetable of breaks may change as the week proceeds. At the
moment of solving Stage 1, the available information consists of the following:
• The set of open deals D.
• The set of breaks Θ for the next week. Each break b ∈ Θ has a Lb time length.
• The set Q of demographics. For each demographic q ∈ Q, the network provides the
value for CPMq, or the cost per thousand impressions based on historical viewership
and marketing considerations.
• The deals’ specifications are given by the advertisers. These specifications define the
targeted demographic of each deal d ∈ D, which is identified by the binary parameter
Gdq, for all q ∈ Q. This is equal to 1 if deal d targets demo q and 0 if not. To simplify
the notation, we define the total target CPM of deal d as CPMd :=
∑
q∈QGdqCPMq,
for all d ∈ D. Also, let ΘD(d) ⊂ Θ be the set of breaks in which deal d can be shown,
for all d ∈ D; and, for notational convenience as well, we define the set DΘ(b) ⊂ D
of deals that can be scheduled in break b, for all b ∈ Θ. Also, each open deal has
a target impressions status Id for the next week, which is the difference between the
promised number of impressions to be delivered on the requested demographic and the
impressions already delivered for the deal from the start day, divided by the number
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of weeks until the deal expires. In the industry, the Deal Stewardship system closely
monitors delivery and provides targets for the remaining life of the deal. In addition,
each deal has a restriction on the maximum number of spots that can be broadcasted,
Jd. For the next week, some of the video spots are already recorded, so their lengths
are determined; however, others are not yet available. Given this lack of information,
in order to create the tentative schedule, we use the historic average length of spots H̄
in the model.
• To meet the target impressions status, we use a time series forecast model presented
in Section 2.6 that estimates ratings r̄qb, for each break b ∈ Θ and demographic q ∈ Q.
For the sake of notational simplicity, let r̄db :=
∑
q∈QGdqr̄qb, for all d ∈ D.
Table 2.2 presents a summary of the notation described above. As explained before,
the schedule cannot be determined exactly because the description of the spots to be sched-
uled are often incomplete, as several detailed scheduling constraints are missing for spots
that are to be aired in the future. Also, the breaks, programs, and lengths are defined but
can change significantly over the next few days. Given the available information at this stage,
we formulate a linear programming model to generate a tentative multi-day schedule. A set
of weights for the day-to-day scheduling problem of Stage 2 is generated as a by-product.
An alternative approach would have been to rely upon decision-makers to prioritize deals in
a quantitative manner to enable making trade-offs among spots from different deals in Stage
2.
Weight Problem: The decision variables of the Stage 1 model are the xdb number of
spots of deal d in break b, for all d ∈ D, and b ∈ ΘD(d); and the yd shortfall or number of
impressions that cannot be delivered of deal d in the case of a lack of forecasted viewership in
27








xdb ≤ LbH̄ ∀b ∈ Θ, (2.20)∑
b∈ΘD(d)
xdb ≤ Jd ∀d ∈ D, (2.21)∑
b∈ΘD(d)
r̄dbxdb + yd ≥ Id ∀d ∈ D (2.22)
yd, xdb ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ D, b ∈ Θ(d). (2.23)
The objective function (2.19) minimizes the value of under-delivered impressions.
Constraint (2.20) ensures that the number of spots that are delivered in each break is less
than or equal to the number of spots available. Constraint (2.21) ensures that the planned
number of spots are allocated as required by the corresponding advertiser of each deal.
Constraint (2.22) links the number of spots delivered, the forecasted ratings in the target
demographic, the shortfall of impressions, and the target number of impression for each deal.
And constraint (2.23) is the nature of variables.
Let Wd be the shadow price of constraint (2.22), for all d ∈ D. It can be interpreted
as the price the network is willing to pay for decreasing the target Id of deal d by one
impression of the target demographic. This is equivalent to treating Wd as the price of each
deal-d-impression. We use this price to determine the penalty in the single-day problem that
is solved in Stage 2 that we present below.
2.4.2 Stage 2: Schedule Spots in Breaks
Stage 2 allocates the spots to breaks per day. This model schedules spots into the
breaks on the actual day, so that the deals assigned higher weights in Stage 1 are given a
larger share of the impressions, both in terms of number of spots and preferred time zones
per day. For the actual day to be scheduled, the network allows the model to move only
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Table 2.2: Stage 1 notation.
Sets and indices:
D, d All open deals.
Θ, b All breaks of the following week. The schedule of breaks is tentative and
can change as the week proceeds.
Q, q Demographics.
DΘ(b) ⊂ D Deals that can be scheduled in break b, for all b ∈ Θ.
ΘD(d) ⊂ Θ Breaks in which deal d can be shown, for all d ∈ D.
q(d) ∈ Q Target demographic for deal d, for all d ∈ D.
Parameters:
CPMq CPM of demographic q, for all q ∈ Q.
S̄ Average number of spots available in a break.
r̄qb Ratings forecast of break b and demographic q, for all b ∈ Θ, q ∈ Q.
Id Target number of impressions for deal d for the following week, for all d ∈ D.
Jd Maximum number of deal d spots planned for delivery in the following week,
for all d ∈ D.
Decision Variables:
xdb Number of spots of deal d in break b, for all d ∈ D, and b ∈ ΘD(d).
yd Shortfall decision variable for deal d , for all d ∈ D.
a given number of spots to avoid disturbing the elegance of the schedule. Moreover, we
include the scheduling rules within each break in Stage 3 to maintain a manageable Stage 2
computational complexity. We focus on optimizing the scheduling at the break level.
Given the Stage 1 deal weights, Stage 2 assigns the spots to breaks in the actual day
so that a series of constraints are met, and the ratings per demographic allocated to spots
are maximized according to the deal weights. The formulation is a mixed integer linear
programing model.
Break Problem: Let B be the set of breaks on the actual day to be scheduled; let U be
the set of spots; let D be the set of deals with spots that can be scheduled in the day; and
let Q be the set of audience demographics. For each deal d ∈ D, q(d) ∈ Q is the targeted
demographic and UD(d) ⊂ U is the set of spots that belong to deal d. From this set, only
ÛD(d) ⊂ UD(d) are guaranteed to be shown on the actual day due to contract considerations.
For each spot i ∈ U, d(i) is the deal to which spot i belongs. The length of spot i is Hi. Given
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the deal specifications of d(i), BU(i) ⊂ B is the set of breaks in which spot i can be scheduled.
Reciprocally, UB(b) ⊂ U is the set of spots that can be scheduled in break b, for each break
b ∈ B. The main decision variable of the model is xib, a binary indicator of whether spot i is
in break b, for each spot i ∈ U and break b ∈ BU(i). If a spot i cannot be scheduled in any
break because of infeasibility, then it is assigned to the bin. Let yi be the binary decision
variable that indicates bin assignation. Recall that Stage 2 receives an original schedule that
can be modified by a given maximum number of moves, namely Mmove. Let ÛB(b) ⊂ UB(b)
be the set of spots scheduled in break b, for each b ∈ B, and let Ubin ⊂ U be the set of spots
that are originally in the bin. Accordingly, let b(i) be the scheduled break of spot i, for each
i ∈ U\Ubin. In this given schedule, all the guaranteed spots are scheduled in a break, that is
ÛD(d)∩Ubin = ∅ for all d ∈ D. At a demand level, i.e., for each deal, the other three relevant
dimensions at this stage are the advertisers, the brands, and the product categories. Let A
be the set of advertisers who sign the deals; and, for each advertiser a ∈ A, let UA(a) ⊂ U be
the set of spots that belong to advertiser a. Each advertiser can have several brands. Let K
be the set of brands; and, for each brand k ∈ K, let UK(k) ⊂ U be the set of brand k spots.
Finally, across brands, P is the set of product categories; and, for each p ∈ P, UP(p) ⊂ U is
the set of spots that belong to product category p. At a supply level, the day is broken into
hours H = 1, . . . , 24, such that BH(h) is the set of breaks to be air in hour h, for all h ∈ H.
Finally, for modeling purposes that will become clear later, let HD(d) be the set of hours in
which the spots of deal d can be shown for all d ∈ D. Notice that HD(d) can be inferred
from the set of spots that belong to deal d and the set of hours in which these spots can be




h : h ≤ Fb ≤ h̄
}
, where h and h̄ are the start
and end day-minutes of hour h, and Fb is the start day-minute of break b.
Objective function (2.24) maximizes the allocated ratings less four types of penalties.
The first term is the sum over deals d ∈ D, guaranteed spots i ∈ ÛD(d), and breaks b ∈ BU(i)
of the allocated ratings in the targeted demographic q(d). This equals the ratings per 30
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by the allocation variable xib and multiplied by the weight of the deal Wd, which is obtained
from the weight model presented in Subsection 2.4.1. The second term is the penalty for
allocating guaranteed spots to the bin, which is the sum of spots assigned to the bin, yi,
multiplied by the ratings allocated in the original schedule Hi
30
r̄b(i)d, and weighted by Wd.
The third term is the sum of decision variable penalties αkb for placing spots of the same
brand k scheduled in consecutive breaks b and b+1. These penalties are defined in the block
of constraints (2.26). Similarly, the fourth term is the sum of decision variable penalties
βab for placing spots of the same advertiser a scheduled in consecutive breaks b and b + 1,
which are defined in the block of constraints (2.27). The fifth term is the sum of decision
variable penalties γduh for not having a uniform scheduled distribution of deal d spots at
hour h, defined in the block of constraints (2.28). The parameters PB, PA and PV are input
multipliers that calibrate the importance of the penalties in the objective function, and are





























For later reference in Section 3.6, we label the five terms as metrics M1 to M5. Hence,
the Stage 2 objective function is equal to M1 - M2 - M3 - M4 - M5. The constraints are the
following:
Network feasibility constraints. This set of constraints impose all the rules that define
a minimally feasible schedule. For example, each spot has to be scheduled in exactly one
break or be placed in the bin. Constraint (2.25a) imposes that each spot i ∈ U is scheduled
for exactly one break or goes into the bin. Constraint (2.25b) restricts for each break b ∈ B
that the sum of the spots’ length, Hi, scheduled in the break should be less than or equal
to the break length, Lb. Constraint (2.25c) imposes that the number of spots that goes into
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the bin must be less than or equal to Mbin, the maximum number of spots that are allowed
in the bin. Lastly, constraint (2.25d) establishes that the number of spots not moved from
the original schedule must be greater than or equal to the total number of spots minus the
maximum number of moves allowed, Mmove. The value Mmove is initially chosen equal to
10% of spots and increased steadily with growing confidence in the model to 50%. This
gradual scaling up mitigates the fear that a machine may be unable to generate an elegant




xib = 1, ∀i ∈ U, (2.25a)∑
i∈UB(b)







yi ≥ |U| −Mmove. (2.25d)
Brand uniform dispersion constraints. It is desirable that spots of the same brand
are separated by at least one break of difference. We impose the following constraint to
define penalties measured in terms of ratings times deal weights when this requirement is
not satisfied. For each brand k ∈ K and break b ∈ B, (2.26a) imposes the relation between
the binary variable zkb—which indicates whether at least one brand k spot is scheduled in
break b—and the total number of brand k spots in break b; (2.26b) and (2.26c) define the
brand separation penalty αkb, which must be greater than or equal to the sum over the spots
that are scheduled in consecutive breaks of the delivered ratings (Hi
30




















r̄bq(d(i))(xib − 1 + zkb−1), ∀k ∈ K, b ∈ B \ {1}.
(2.26c)
Advertiser uniform dispersion constraints. These are similar to brand uniform disper-
sion constraints, but these apply to advertisers instead of brands.
∑
i∈UB(b)∩UA(a)














r̄bq(d(i))(xib − 1 + vab−1), ∀a ∈ K, b ∈ B \ {1}. (2.27c)
Time based uniform dispersion constraints. Advertisers want spots to be as uniformly
distributed as possible in each hour. To model this, we define penalties that measure the
deviation in the number of spots per hour from the average number of spots scheduled in an
hour. For each deal d ∈ D and hour h ∈ HD(d), constraints (2.28a) and (2.28b) define the
difference θdh over the maximum allowed deviation M
dev
d from the average number of spots
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, ∀d ∈ D, h ∈ HD(d). (2.28c)
A-position and Z-position constraints. By advertisement requirements, some of the
spots must be scheduled at the first (last) positions of breaks, which in industry parlance are
called A(Z)-position spots. Let UA ⊂ U be this set of spots. The positioning inside the break
is determined in Stage 3, so Stage 2 must ensure that in each break there must be assigned
at most one of the spots of UA. Constraint (2.29a) ensures that this happens. Similarly,
some of the spots must be scheduled at the end of a break, or, the Z-position spots. Let
UZ ⊂ U be this set of spots. Constraint (2.29b) imposes that for each break b ∈ B only one
of these spots can be assigned. The other specific positions inside the breaks are determined
by Stage 3, which is explained in Subsection 2.4.3.
∑
i∈UA∩UB(b)
xib ≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B, (2.29a)∑
i∈UZ∩UB(b)
xib ≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B. (2.29b)
The other specific positions inside the breaks are determined by Stage 3, which is
explained in Subsection 2.4.3.
Minimum separation constraints. The contracts define that certain pairs of spot must
be scheduled in breaks separated by at least a given amount of time. For example, an
advertiser may want to have their spots separated by at least 30 minutes, or may want
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a separation of 45 minutes from other spots of the same product category, or may want a
separation of one hour from spots of a rival brand. Let U2Sep ⊂ U×U be the set of pair of spot
that must be separated; and, for each (i, j) ∈ U2Sep, let Dij be the requested separation time,
in minutes. Because at this stage we only schedule at a break level and not at a position
inside the break, the constraints must ensure that the start time of the breaks where spots i
and j are scheduled must be separated by at least Dij plus the average length of a break in
minutes, L̄. For that, we define the binary decision variable wij that is equal to 1 if spot i is
scheduled before spot j. Constraints (2.30a) and (2.30b) impose that the difference between
the start time of the spot that is scheduled later in the day and the spot that is scheduled










Fbxjb ≥ (Dij + L̄)(1− wij)− (24× 60)wij, ∀(i, j) ∈ U2Sep. (2.30b)
The set U2Sep is defined for three different pairs of spot types: 1) separation of spots from the
same advertiser or spots from a specific set of advertisers, 2) separation of spots from the
same brand or spots from a specific set of brands, and 3) separation of spots from the same
product category or spots from a specific set of product categories. If a pair of spots has
multiple separation requests, only the constraint for the maximum separation is created.
Association constraints . These are three constraint types required by the advertisers for
specific spot pairs related by their content, so they must the broadcasted in a specific order
and positions inside a break. The first type is the so called sandwich constraints. These
spot pairs must be shown in the same break but should be separated by at least one spot
within the break, hence the name sandwich. The second type is the piggyback constraints.
These spot pairs must be shown in the same break in consecutive positions, hence the name
“piggyback”. For each advertiser a ∈ A, let U2ASdw(a) ⊂ UA(a)×UA(a) be the set of spot pairs
that must satisfy sandwich constraints, and let U2APig(a) ⊂ UA(a)×UA(a) be the spot pairs set
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that must satisfy piggyback constraints. Constraint (2.31a) imposes that each sandwich and
piggyback spot pair must be in the same break. Additionally, constraint (2.31b) ensures that
if a sandwich pair (i, j) is scheduled in break b ∈ BU(i), then at least one other spot that is
not type A-position or type Z-position must be assigned to the break, in order to have a spot
between i and j for the model of Stage 3. Last, the third constraints type is the consecutive
breaks constraints (2.31c), for which each pair of spots in U2ACon(a) ⊂ UA(a) × UA(a) must
be assigned to consecutive breaks.
xib = xjb, ∀a ∈ A, (i, j) ∈ U2ASdw(a) ∪ U2APig(a), b ∈ BU(i), (2.31a)∑
i′∈UB(b)/{i,j}∪UA∪UZ
xi′b ≥ xib, ∀a ∈ A, (i, j) ∈ U2ASdw(a), b ∈ BU(i), (2.31b)
xib = xj(b+1), ∀a ∈ A, (i, j) ∈ U2ACon(a), b ∈ B \ {|B|}. (2.31c)
Product category constraints. In each break, a specific maximum number of spots of
the same product category can be shown. Let P be the set of product categories; and, for
each p ∈ P, let UP(p) ⊂ U be the set of spots that belong to product category p. Constraint
(2.32) imposes that a maximum of MBpb product category p spots can be assigned to break b.∑
i∈UP(p)∩UB(b)
xib ≤MBpb, ∀p ∈ P, b ∈ B, (2.32)
Nature of variables.
xib ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ U, b ∈ BU(i),
yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ U,
zkb ∈ {0, 1}, αkb ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, b ∈ B,
vab ∈ {0, 1}, βab ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, (2.33)
θdh, γdh ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ D, h ∈ HD(h),
wij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ U2Sep.
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Table 2.3: Stage 2 sets and indices.
Supply sets and indices:
B, b Breaks within the actual day to be scheduled.
H, h Hours. H = 1, . . . , 24
BH(h) ⊂ B Breaks in hour h, for all h ∈ H.
Q, q Demographics.
Demand sets and indices:
A, a Advertisers.
K, k Brands.
D, d Open deals that can be scheduled in at least one of the breaks b ∈ B.
U, i, j Spots.
P, p Product categories.
UA(a) ⊂ U Spots that belong to advertiser a, for all a ∈ A.
UK(k) ⊂ U Spots of brand k, for all k ∈ K.
UD(d) ⊂ U Spots that belong to deal d, for all d ∈ D.
d(i) ∈ D Deal to which spot i belongs, for all i ∈ U.
ÛD(d) ⊂ UD(d) Spots of deal d that are guaranteed ( i.e., must be aired and together must
achieve the viewership target), for all d ∈ D.
UP(p) ⊂ U Spots that belong to product category p, for all p ∈ P.
Sets that define constraints:
UA ⊂ U Spots that must be scheduled at the first position within a break∗.
UZ ⊂ U Spots that must be scheduled at the last position within a break∗.
U2Sep ⊂ U× U Pair of spots that must be separated by time∗.
U2ASdw(a) ⊂ UA(a) ×
UA(a)
Pair of spots that must satisfy sandwich constraint∗ for advertiser a, for all
a ∈ A.
U2APig(a) ⊂ UA(a) ×
UA(a)
Pair of spots that must satisfy piggyback constraint∗ for advertiser a, for
all a ∈ A.
U2ACon(a) ⊂ UA(a) ×
UA(a)
Pair of spots that must be scheduled in consecutive breaks∗ for advertiser
a, for all a ∈ A.
Demand-Supply sets and indices:
BU(i) ⊂ B Valid breaks for spot i (i.e., breaks within which the spot can be aired), for
all i ∈ U.
UB(b) ⊂ U Valid spots for break b, for all b ∈ B.
ÛB(b) ⊂ UB(b) Spots assigned to break b in the original schedule, for all b ∈ B.
b(i) ∈ B Original break to which spot i is assigned, for all i ∈ U \ Ubin.
Ubin ⊂ U Spots that are in the bin in the original schedule.
HD(d) ⊂ H Set of hours within which deal d can be shown, for all d ∈ D.
q(d) ∈ Q Target demographic for deal d, for all d ∈ D.
Note. Latin calligraphic uppercase denotes set. ∗ Constraints explained in the formulation. The notation
|C| refers to the cardinality of a set C.
Table 2.3 presents the sets and the indices, while Table 2.4 summarizes the parameters
used in Stage 2. Table 2.5 presents the decision variables. Where possible, brief notes are
given to make the notation understandable without reference to the model.
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Table 2.4: Stage 2 parameters.
r̄bq Ratings forecast in 30 seconds of break b, demographic q, for all b ∈ B, q ∈
Q.
Fb Start time of break b, for all b ∈ B.
Lb Length of break b in seconds, for all b ∈ B.
L̄ Average break length in seconds.
Hi Length of spot i in seconds, for all i ∈ U.
Wd Weight of deal d that is obtained in Stage 1, for all d ∈ D.
PB Brand separation penalty factor
∗.
PA Advertiser separation penalty factor
∗.
PV Vertical uniformity penalty factor
∗.
Dij Minimum separation
∗ between spots i and j, for all (i, j) ∈ U2Sep.
Mbin Maximum number of spots allowed in the bin. Mbin ≥ |Ubin|.
Mmove Maximum number of spots that may be moved. Policy variable to ensure
the original log’s “beauty” is preserved.
Mdevd Maximum number of spots of deal d per hour allowed to deviate from the
average number of spots per hour, for all d ∈ D.
MBpb Maximum number of spots from the same product category p that can be
placed within break b, for all p ∈ P and b ∈ B.
Note. Latin uppercase denotes parameter. ∗The extended definition of these parameters are presented in
the formulation.
Table 2.5: Stage 2 decision variables.
Binary decision variables:
xib Equal to 1 if spot i is scheduled in break b, 0 otherwise, for all spots i ∈ U,
and breaks b ∈ BU(i).
yi Equal to 1 if spot i is added to the bin, 0 otherwise, for all spots i ∈ U.
zkb Equal to 1 if at least one spot of brand k is scheduled in break b, 0 otherwise,
for all brands k ∈ K, and breaks b ∈ B.
vab Equal to 1 if at least one spot of advertiser a is scheduled in break b, 0
otherwise, for all advertisers a ∈ A, and breaks b ∈ B.
wij Equal to 1 if spot i is scheduled before spot j, 0 otherwise, for all pairs of
spots (i, j) ∈ U2Sep.
Non negative decision variables:
αkb Penalty for scheduling two spots of brand k in consecutive breaks b and
b+ 1, for all brands k ∈ K and breaks b ∈ B.
βab Penalty for scheduling two spots of advertiser a in consecutive breaks b and
b+ 1, for all advertisers a ∈ A and breaks b ∈ B.
γdh Penalty for vertical uniformity deviation, of deal d and hour h, for all deals
d ∈ D and hours h ∈ HD(d).
θdh Vertical uniformity deviation of deal d and hour h, for all deals d ∈ D and
hours h ∈ HD(d).
Note. Latin lowercase denotes binary decision variable. Greek letter denotes non-negative decision variable.
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The Stage 2 formulation is flexible in terms of accommodating other considerations
that may be required by the advertisers or the network. For example, the user may wish to
force the scheduling of certain spots that are not guaranteed but must be shown for business
considerations, or the user may wish to impose a given number of spots on the log and add
constraints that prevent under-delivered deals from becoming worse than before.
2.4.3 Stage 3: Arrange Spots in Break Positions
Stage 3 schedules the spots to their actual positions within the breaks on the actual
day. Any unscheduled spots are stored in a repository referred to as the bin. After the spots
are assigned to breaks, it is necessary to sort them to satisfy the internal break constraints.
We can solve the arrangement problem by break. For each break b ∈ B, let Ũ(b) be the set
of spots that are assigned to break b in Stage 2. Therefore, the number of positions in break
b is |Ũ(b)|. Let x̂il be a binary variable that is equal to 1 if spot i is scheduled in position
l, for all i ∈ Ũ(b), l ≤ |Ũ(b)|. To model the piggyback and sandwich constraints, let Ũ2Pig(b)
be the set of piggyback spot pairs, and let Ũ2Sdw(b) be the set of sandwich spot pairs that are
assigned to break b in Stage 2. Let iA(b) and iZ(b) be the A-position and Z-position spots
that are assigned to break b in Stage 2, if any. Because of all these constraints, there is a
chance that the allocation of all the spots to positions is infeasible. In that case, we assign
spots to the bin and maximize the weighted ratings allocated, as in Stage 2. Let ŷi be the
binary variable that indicates whether spot i ∈ Ũ(b) goes into the bin. Table 2.6 summarizes
the notation described above.


















x̂il ≤ 1 ∀l ≤ |Ũ(b)|, (2.35)
∑
l≤|Ũ(b)|
x̂il + ŷi = 1 ∀i ∈ Ũ(b), (2.36)
x̂iA(b)1 = 1, x̂iZ(b)|Ũ(b)| = 1, (2.37)
x̂il = x̂j(l+1) l ≤ |Ũ(b)| − 1,∀(i, j) ∈ Ũ2Pig(b), (2.38)
x̂jl = 0 l ∈ {1, 2},∀(i, j) ∈ Ũ2Sdw(b), (2.39)
x̂il + x̂j(l+1) ≤ 1 l ≤ |Ũ(b)| − 1,∀(i, j) ∈ Ũ2Sdw(b), (2.40)
l∑
t=1
x̂it ≥ x̂j(l+2) l ≤ |Ũ(b)| − 2,∀(i, j) ∈ Ũ2Sdw(b), (2.41)
x̂il, ŷi ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ Ũ(b), l ≤ |Ũ(b)|. (2.42)
The objective function (2.34) maximizes the weighted ratings allocated to spots as in
Stage 2. Constraint (2.35) ensures that no more than one spot is assigned per position, and
constraint (2.36) imposes that each spot must be assigned to only one position or to the bin.
Constraint (2.37) imposes A-position and Z-position constraints. This means that if Stage
2 assigns the A-position spot iA(b) to break b, then that spot must be scheduled in the first
position of the break. Similarly, if the Z-position spot iZ(b) is assigned to break b by Stage
2, then that spot must be scheduled in the last position of the break. Constraint (2.38)
imposes the piggyback condition, meaning that the spots (i, j) ∈ Ũ2Pig(b) must be scheduled
in consecutive positions. Constraints block (2.39) to (2.41) are the sandwich constraints:
For each pair of sandwich spots (i, j) ∈ Ũ2Sdw(b), (2.39) imposes that j can neither be in
position 1 nor position 2, constraint (2.40) ensures that spots i and j are separated by at
least one position, and constraint (2.41) establishes that spot i must be scheduled before
spot j. Finally, constraint (2.42) is the nature of variables.
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Table 2.6: Stage 3 sets and indices.
B, b Breaks.
U, i, j Spots.
Ũ(b) ⊂ U Spots that are assigned to break b in Stage 2, for all b ∈ B.
iA(b) A-position spots that are assigned to break b in Stage 2, if any, for all b ∈ B.
iZ(b) Z-position spots that are assigned to break b in Stage 2, if any, for all b ∈ B.
Ũ2Sdw(b) ⊂ Ũ(b)× Ũ(b) Pairs of spots that must satisfy sandwich constraints and are assigned to
break b in Stage 2, for all b ∈ B.
Ũ2Pig(b) ⊂ Ũ(b)× Ũ(b) Pairs of spots that must satisfy piggyback constraints and are assigned to
break b in Stage 2, for all b ∈ B.
2.5 Computational Implementation
The three stages are solved sequentially and with each stage we use a more granular
formulation, as discussed in the prior sections. Stage 1 is solved once every week. This stage
is solved offline so as to not impact any business operations. However, Stages 2 and 3 are
solved one or more times each day. The maximum acceptable solution time is determined
by the following two factors: First, all business operations related to the spots for the
day in question must be suspended while optimization occurs, and cannot resume until the
optimization model has been solved and the revised schedule has been created. Second, the
network prefers to perform the optimization after all the work and changes related to the
schedule of programs and the spots to schedule have been made, because any changes after
Stages 2 and 3 can disturb the optimal solution. In this way, the network can implement
the schedule immediately after the optimization. Therefore, there is a limited time for the
optimization models to run. Typically, the network allows no more than 10 minutes for
solving Stages 2 and 3 combined in order to have a final spot schedule. We describe the
solution approach for each stage below.
Stage 1: Estimate Deal Weights. This model is an LP that is easy to solve using a
state-of-the-art linear programming solver.
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Stage 2: Schedule Spots in Breaks. Initially, we modeled and experimented solving
with Stages 2 and 3 in a combined formulation. That formulation did not produce a feasible
solution after several hours of branch and bound using a state-of-the-art integer programming
solver. So we divided that formulation into Stages 2 and 3. In terms of problem size and
computational effort, Stage 2 is the most challenging. For a single day, the typical size
of the IP model described in Subsection 2.4.2 includes tens of thousands of variables and
constraints (see Table 2.8). The integer programming solver that we have used for this
project, Fico Xpress 8.2, produces a near optimal solution after more than three hours, by
branch and bound and default settings. Given the limited time for generating a solution
and the large problem size, the availability of a starting solution given by the network is
an advantage. After experimentation, we found that the solution approach that produces
the best solutions quickly is an iterative process in which we feed an initial solution, or
warm start solution, and allow a small number of changes. Recall that the network allows
a maximum number of moves Mmove, used in constraint (2.25d). As we described before,
that number is approximately 50% of the total number of spots. Initially, we set Mmove
equal to 5%, feed the initial solution as warm start producing a new near optimal solution
in a few minutes. We then increase Mmove to 10% using the previously obtained schedule
as a warm start to produce a new near optimal solution. The iterative procedure continues
in this fashion until reaching the original Mmove. This procedure produces a near optimal
solution in more than 30 minutes, which is not quick enough. A second enhancement that
accelerates the iterative procedure is to randomly fix certain spots in breaks; then unfixing
them and fixing others; until the last iteration has all the spots unfixed (this type of local
search procedure had been used in the literature with equal success; for example, by [21]).
The constraints that make the problem difficult to solve are the minimum separation
constraints (2.30). Without these constraints the problem solves relatively quickly. These
constraints enforce an ordering in every pair of breaks that the network imposes. This
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difficulty motivates the idea of including in the fixing procedure at each iteration a certain
number of the wij variables that model the ordering between spots i and j, to be equal to
the sequence of the warm start solution. If wij is fixed to one at any iteration, then spot
i must be scheduled before spot j and constraint (2.30) associated to the tuple (i, j) is not
needed. At the next iteration, this variable is unfixed (this is similar to some extent to [28],
who use topological sorting for solving heuristically an open-pit mine production scheduling
problem).
Using these enhancements, Xpress computes a near optimal solution at the root node
of the branch and bound. It produces a final solution with the original Mmove in less than
10 minutes.
Stage 3: Arrange Spots in Break Positions. The Stage 3 model that positions the
spots inside the breaks is an IP that is easy to solve because the problem can be separated
by breaks; therefore, it reduces to arranging about 10 spots in an ordering that satisfies all
the constraints.
By reformulating the problem in three stages, the approach solves the scheduling
problem while satisfying all the constraints with a near optimal solution in less than 10
minutes. Computational evidence is presented in Section 3.6.
2.6 Ratings Forecasts
Recall that the ratings forecasts are used in the weight problem and the break prob-
lem, which we present in Subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, respectively. The parameter to es-
timate is r̄bq, the ratings forecast in break b of demographic q, for all b ∈ B, q ∈ Q. We
briefly describe the methods followed and the issues encountered below (for the interested
reader, several papers are devoted to ratings forecasting; for example, Danaher and Dagger
[25], Danaher et al. [26], Webster et al. [81] and citations within).
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Time considerations: We receive the realized ratings one week after the day of broad-
casting. Therefore, we have the history of ratings up to one week before the date of airing.
Also, a full day is broken into 15–minute intervals; hence, there are 96 quarter hours per day.
So, we forecast the ratings per quarter hour and then we map to the corresponding break(s)
that are broadcasted in each quarter hour.
Demographics: As we describe in Section 2.1, the demographics that the networks sell are
defined using two dimensions: gender and age group. The networks consider 2 possibilities
for gender, Female (F) and Male (M) (some media are starting to recognize other genders;
for example, Facebook). The age dimension is divided into eight groups (1-5, 6-10, 11-15,
16-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-51, and 51+). Hence, there are 16 demographics in total (|Q| = 16).
This results in a total of 96 × 16 time series to forecast.
Ratings Patterns: The ratings are highly variable, as the plots in Figure 2.2 show. Plots
2.2(a) are ratings per day of the week in a representative demographic; each day of the
week follows its own pattern. Plots 2.2(b) are the ratings per quarter–hour from 07:00
to 23:45 on a representative day. We can see that the ratings per consecutive quarter–
hours are highly correlated, as it would be expected in television programming. A typical
quarter– hour–demographic time series has an approximate coefficient of variation (standard
deviation/sample mean) of 0.5. Also, when a new season starts with different programming,
the past ratings for different programs are often poor predictors for the future. Therefore,
as a policy, we restart the forecast every season.
Ratings Models: We tested a battery of time series methods (past ratings average, Holt-
Winters and ARIMA); we omit the mathematical details of these models because they are
standard. For reference, see any good time series book (e.g., Shumway and Stoffer [66]). We
evaluated different strategies of data usage: all past ratings or only a recent subset; all the
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(b) Ratings per quarter hour representative week.
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Figure 2.2: Examples of ratings time series.
Note. Ratings are normalized to one and correspond to one particular large demographic.
days of the week combined or only the corresponding day of the week; different aggregation
and disaggregation methods (aggregation per day, by show, and by demographic in one or two
dimensions). Our benchmark forecast is the past ratings average, which has an approximate
44% mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). Measured by MAPE, none of the methods are
found to be superior for all the series. But, for a particular combination of day of the week,
time of the day, and demographic, a specific method often produced consistently superior
results. We use the method that is the most competitive in terms of MAPE (for test sets).
The MAPEs that we obtain for the actual ratings are around 32%. We implemented the
time series models using the R forecast package [39].
2.6.1 Protecting Against Uncertainty: Pair of Break Ratings Difference
We further improve the optimization by taking advantage of the correlation between
ratings of breaks. The objective function increases by doing swaps that bring the highest
increase in delivery impressions among the target demographics. Therefore, more important
than the accuracy of point forecast is the precision of the estimate of the difference between
break pairs. A simple analysis demonstrates that higher accuracy is obtained by swapping
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pair of breaks that have higher correlation. Let Rb and Rb′ be the ratings random variable of
breaks b and b′. Assuming that these random variables are normally distributed with mean
equal to the point forecasts, r̄b and r̄b′ , and standard deviations σb and σb′ , with covariance
σbb′ and correlation ρbb′ , i.e.,
Rb ∼ N(r̄b, σ2b ),





then the difference in ratings random variable, Dbb′ := Rb−Rb′ , is also normally distributed
as
Dbb′ ∼ N(r̄b − r̄b′ , σ2b + σ2b′ − 2σbb′).
Defining d̄bb′ := r̄b − r̄b′ and ∆bb′ := Dbb′ − d̄bb′ , we obtain
∆bb′ ∼ N(0, σ2b + σ2b′ − 2σbb′). (2.43)
From historical data, we observe that the empirical distribution corresponds to the
above distribution. For a sample from 24 November 2014 to 27 November 2016, the correla-
tion for every pair of breaks along the day lies in the interval [−0.061, 0.999]. High correlation
is mostly for pair of breaks that are close to each other, as is shown on the correlation ma-
trix heat map of Figure 2.3(a). Using that historical data, we train the forecast model and
produce point forecast, r̄b, for a test week from 12 December 2016 to 18 December 2016 and
compute the difference between every pair of breaks (b.b′) : b < b′ per day, d̄bb′ := r̄b − r̄b′ .
After the test week unfolds, we compute the actual difference, dbb′ := rb − rb′ , i.e., the real-
ization of the random variable Dbb′ . Finally, we calculate the difference δbb′ := dbb′− d̄bb′ , i.e.,
the realization of random variable ∆bb′ . The scatter plot δbb′ vs. ρbb′ of Figure 2.3(b) shows
that the volatility of δbb′ decreases when ρbb′ increases as distribution (2.43) suggests.
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(a) Correlation ρbb′ between pair of breaks (b, b
′) (b) δbb′ vs. ρbb′ scatter plot



























Figure 2.3: Analysis of difference between actual and forecast ratings differences for every
pair of breaks.
Note: Panel (a) is a ratings correlation, ρbb′ , heatmap between every pair of breaks (b, b
′). Breaks are
labeled by the half hour of which each break belongs: half hour 1 is 6:00 AM, half hour 2 is 6:30 AM,. . .,
half hour 24 is 5:30 PM,. . ., and half hour 48 is 5:30 AM. Color blue signals negative correlation and red
positive correlation. Higher correlation is mostly between close breaks. In panel (b), δbb′ := dbb′ − d̄bb′ ,
where dbb′ := rb − rb′ is the difference of actual ratings between pair of breaks (b, b′) and d̄bb′ := r̄b − r̄b′ is
the difference of forecast ratings. Swaps between breaks with low correlation should be avoided because the
predictive accuracy of the difference is low.
This result implies that swaps between breaks with high correlation increases the
accuracy of the forecasted expected revenue. Managers prefer a schedule that would produce
revenue with tight confidence interval rather than a risky schedule with revenue in a wide
confidence interval. To exploit the correlation, in Stage 2 we impose constraint (2.44) that
prohibits swaps between breaks that have correlation lower than a certain threshold. For
every pair of breaks (b, b′) ∈ B×B such that the correlation between them is lower than the
minimum threshold (ρbb′ ≤ Correlation Threshold), and for every spot i that is assigned to
break b in the original schedule, i.e., i ∈ ÛB(b), the spot i cannot be assigned to break b′.
xib′ = 0, ∀b ∈ B, i ∈ ÛB(b), b′ such that ρbb′ ≤ Correlation Threshold. (2.44)
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In the actual implementation, the variable xib′ is eliminated from the instance (i.e., UB(b
′)←
UB(b
′) \ {i} and BU(i) ← BU(i) \ {b′}). This elimination reduces the size of the problem
considerably. Simulation experiments show that the expected revenue is not affected greatly
by this reduction of flexibility and that the actual revenue is typically close to the predicted
revenue. Interestingly, although many possible swaps amongst spots are eliminated, we
observe that several long chains of swaps are maintained: starting from any break it is
possible to follow a sequence of swaps between connected breaks (pair of breaks that have
correlation greater than the threshold) that visits all the breaks and come back to the initial
one. The theory of process flexibility and long chains [5, 22, 23, 34, 42, 67, 68, 80] prompts
us to think that this phenomena is to be expected, but we keep this question open for further
research. We describe the chains in the next section.
2.7 Results
The framework has been used successfully for major television networks of the U.S.
and India, generating 3% to 5% increase in revenue which translate in tens of millions of
dollars annually for a big network. In order to communicate with the existing networks’ data
bases and also to integrate the in-house software used for scheduling the logs (before passing
a feasible log to the optimizer) with the scheduler, a commercial decision support system
was built by a software company 1. Screen shots of the system are presented in Appendix
A.2. As we remark in Section 2.5, we implemented the optimization models in Xpress 8.2.
To quantify the yield generated and the quality of the optimized schedules, in this
section we benchmark the schedules produced by our models against the ones provided before
optimization for one major network. We compare the daily schedules for a full month. On
average, the optimized schedules produce a conservative increase in revenue of more than
1The commercial software application is AdVant by RSG Media Systems.
48
Table 2.7: Stage 2 instance size summary statistics.
# Breaks # Demographics # Advertisers # Brands # Deals # Spots # PCat
|B| |Q| |A| |K| |D| |U| |P|
Mean 150 16 83 164 124 672 255
Stdev 19.77 2.04 6.50 20.01 18.07 82.62 0.00
CV 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.00
Note. |Set|: number of elements in Set. Stdev: standard deviation. CV: coefficient of variation (Stdev/mean).
PCat: product categories. Instances are 31 days of August of a sample year.
$24,500 per day, which translates to almost $9 million per year.
All data, while representative of the problem, are disguised for the purpose of main-
taining confidentiality. In this section, we present summary statistics of the instances and
the results. The disaggregated data is shown in the online supplement.
2.7.1 Instances, Problem Size, and Optimality Gap
We benchmark the approach using the schedules of one major network’s channel for
the 31 days of August of a sample year (See Table A.1). In this subsection, we present
the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation across the 31 days of several mea-
sures. The details results are given in Appendix A.1. These results are representative across
different cable channels and countries in which the solution is used.
The average day instance has 150 breaks, 16 targeted demographics, 83 advertisers,
164 brands, 124 deals, 672 spots, and 255 product categories. See Table 2.7 for the descriptive
statistics of the instances.
Because the Stage 2 model is the most difficult to solve, we describe the problem size
of that model. The average problem has 11,661 binary variables, 13,489 continuous variables,
and 24,007 constraints. After 10 minutes of optimization, our Stage 2 iterative procedure
described in Section 2.5 produces a nearly optimal schedule as indicated by the 0.57% MIP
gap on average (100×(LP solution-IP solution)/LP solution). See Table 2.8 for the summary
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Table 2.8: Stage 2 problem size summary statistics.
Per day # Binary vars. # Continuous vars. # Constraints MIP gap
Mean 11,661 13,489 24,007 0.57%
Stdev 7,315 5,704 9,539 0.39%
CV 0.63 0.42 0.40 0.68
Note. Stdev: standard deviation. CV: coefficient of variation (Stdev/mean). MIP gap = ((MIP objective
function - best LP bound objective function)/best LP bound objective function)× 100. Instances are 31
days of August of a sample year.
of the daily problem size (disaggregated metrics are in Table A.2).
2.7.2 Benchmark
In this subsection, we present results showing the day-by-day yield for one month.
We set benchmarks using two metrics, namely, the weighted average ratings (M1) and the
increase in revenue (Value). The comparison is made between the original schedule provided

















We compute the two measures for the ORG and OPT schedules using forecasted as
well as actual ratings.
Recall that the weight Wd is an artifact that we compute in order to assign relative
importance to the deals as discussed in Section 2.4. However, the network assumes a weight
equal to 1 for all deals at the time its original schedule is generated. Hence, in order to
establish a fair comparison, in this benchmark we assume Wd = 1 for all deals.
Concerning penalties, we compare the sum of the penalties M2+M3+M4+M5 for the
ORG and OPT schedules. These penalties are used to impose the soft constraints in the
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Table 2.9: Allocated ratings and value based on forecast ratings.
Weighted average ratings (M1) Value
Per day ORG OPT gain ORG OPT gain
Mean 87,193,858 89,088,245 2.21% $1,439,032 $1,468,577 2.08%
Stdev 14,114,964 14,215,505 1.31% $279,133 $283,092 1.30%
CV 0.16 0.16 0.59 0.19 0.19 0.62
Note. Stdev: standard deviation. CV: coefficient of variation (Stdev/mean). ORG: original schedule.
OPT: optimized schedule. gain = ((OPT-ORG)/ORG)× 100. We use a random scaling factor to maintain
confidentiality, but the order of magnitudes correspond to the true values.
design of the schedule and they do not have an intrinsic monetary value. Therefore, we
compare them only for the schedule with forecasted ratings.
Table 2.9 presents the summary results based on the forecasted ratings, which are
used to produce the schedules. In terms of allocated ratings, or M1, the optimized schedule
allocates, on average, 2.21% higher ratings to the spots. In terms of value, the average day
of forecasted ratings has a total value of $1.47 million, so each percent gain is equivalent
to roughly $14, 700. For the test month using the forecasted ratings, the OPT schedules
produce a 2.08% value gain. Considering the variability of value gain across days using
the forecasted ratings, we observe that the coefficient of variation is 0.62, which indicates
that the gain is consistently superior (disaggregated results in Table A.3). Evidently, the
optimized schedule for the forecasted ratings always dominates the original schedule, which
is used as the starting solution.
Table 2.10 displays the mean and standard deviation across the 31 days of the penal-
ties M2+M3+M4+M5 for the ORG and OPT schedules. The penalties of ORG are much
higher than OPT, as the 31.49 ratio indicates. Analyzing the disaggregated data per day
shown in Table A.4, we observe that the OPT penalties are equal to 0 for many days (15 of
31 days, versus 0 of 31 days for the ORG schedule). Therefore, the OPT schedules violate
far fewer of the soft constraints (on some days they violate none of the soft constraints) than
the ORG schedules, which always incur penalties due to violations.
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Table 2.10: Penalties based on forecast ratings.
Penalties (M2+M3+M4+M5)
ORG OPT ORG/OPT
Mean 3,734,878 118,604 31.49
Stdev 2,292,353 181,199 12.65
Note. Stdev: standard deviation. ORG: original schedule. OPT: optimized schedule. We use a random
scaling factor to maintain confidentiality, but the order of magnitudes correspond to the true values.
Table 2.11 shows the allocated ratings and value that are obtained by inserting the
actual ratings into the schedules produced using the forecasted ratings. In terms of value
gain, the OPT schedule has a daily value of $1.85 million and is, on average, 1.34% superior
to ORG, which translates into a daily average of more than $24,500. However, the value
gain coefficient of variation is 1.02, which indicates a high variation. Observing the value
gain per each day in Table A.5, the optimized schedule dominates the original schedule in
29 of the 31 days. In the two days on which ORG is better than OPT, the difference is no
more than 0.34%. Based on the data, we can compute the empirical probability of a gain
using the following expression:










Therefore, although it is possible that the original schedule is superior compared to the
optimized schedule for the actual ratings, the probability of that event is less than 0.0101
for the test month. This unlikely event could occur because the forecasted ratings differ
significantly from the actual ratings; and, merely due to chance, the original schedule is
better than the optimized schedule. The likelihood of this event shows that the original
schedules are of good quality, but because of the highly competitive nature of the U.S.
media industry, the networks are constantly searching for sophisticated methods to extract
more yield from their audience.
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Table 2.11: Allocated ratings and value based on actual ratings.
Weighted average ratings (M1) Value
Per day ORG OPT gain ORG OPT gain
Mean 106,047,503 107,570,039 1.50% $1,825,764 $1,849,022 1.34%
Stdev 22,259,809 22,256,253 1.56% $500,914 $501,706 1.37%
CV 0.21 0.21 1.03 0.27 0.27 1.02
Note. Stdev: standard deviation. CV: coefficient of variation (Stdev/mean). org: original schedule. opt:
optimized schedule. gain = ((opt-org)/org)× 100. I use a random scaling factor to maintain confidentiality,
but the order of magnitudes correspond to the true values. Actual ratings are obtained after the spots are
aired.
2.7.3 Where does the lift come from?
In this section, we describe the difficulty in obtaining the lift. The obvious question is
whether simple heuristics can yield the same quality of solution. For example, if most of the
lift comes from exchanging pairs of units, one high viewership unit of an overperforming deal
with one low viewership unit of an underperforming deal, then the search for such exchanges
becomes relatively trivial. It turns out that the reality of how the lift is created is very
different and complicated. We traced the move of a unit from its original position to the
next, the unit there to the next, etc., until some unit moves back to the first position thus
completing a cycle. To our surprise, the chains of such moves have three features: (i) they are
relatively long (see Figure 2.4(c)); (ii) each move is to an adjacent or close break (see Figure
2.4(a)); and (iii) most moves either gain or lose only a little but a few moves create a huge
lift indicating that the lift associated with the unit wise moves has a long tail distribution
(see Figures 2.4(b) and 2.4(d)). There are two main reasons for this phenomenon: (a) We
restrict moves to pairs of break whose ratings are highly correlated; and (b) shorter moves
are less likely to affect constraints such as uniformity. The chains structure also allows us
to enable manual moves of units when automation of moves is not feasible. As a practical
consideration, recall that after the new schedule is determined, it has to be implemented in
the system. Software integration is necessary if the software program will make the moves.
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(a) # of moves from break b to b′ (b) Average % Lift dbb′ of scheduled moves b to b
′
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Figure 2.4: Where the lift comes from analysis.
Note. August of a sample year moves. Panel (a) shows the total number of moves from break b to break b′.
Breaks are labeled by the half hour of which each break belongs: half hour 1 is 6:00 AM, half hour 2 is 6:30
AM,. . ., half hour 24 is 5:30 PM,. . ., and half hour 48 is 5:30 AM. Blue color intensity signals the number of
moves, from white marking 0 moves to dark blue signaling up to 42 moves. In total there are 3766 moves.
Panel (b) shows the average percentage audience difference (lift) of the scheduled moves from b to b′. Red
intensity indicates negative lift, green intensity indicates positive lift and white denotes no lift (it has a right
skewed distribution: min. lift is -88.9% , median is 0.0%, mean is 7.8% and max. is 909.9%). We observe
that some moves are sacrificed with negative lift from breaks b to b′, b > b′, with the aim of allowing high lift
moves from breaks b to b′, b < b′. Panel (c) shows the number of chains per chain length. And panel (d) is
a histogram of % of lift per move for all the days of August of a sample year. Same distribution is observed
if we separate by day of the week or even per each day (see figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A.1).
If the moves have to be made manually, then we drop the “last” unit to the bin then work
back in the chain moving one unit at a time. Then, if necessary, we bring the dropped (or
another) unit back from the bin to the first position.
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Table 2.12: Summary statistics of lift per day in %.
Day count min median mean max
Monday 445 -80.332 0 8.808 559.6
Tuesday 598 -71.435 0 6.938 239.71
Wednesday 557 -88.902 0.839 20.657 801.081
Thursday 513 -87.135 0.799 17.068 1166.002
Friday 590 -66.559 1.116 13.644 292.541
Saturday 580 -68.083 0 8.849 335.571
Sunday 483 -67.915 3.274 14.471 909.987
2.8 Conclusions
The major revenue source for television networks is the selling of viewers to advertis-
ers. Therefore, an efficient audience distribution among advertisers is essential to maximize
the yield. This process involves the scheduling of advertisements, or spots, within commercial
breaks. The goal of the schedule is to arrange the spots in the breaks so that each spot is
shown to its targeted demographic. This multi-period scheduling problem is very difficult to
solve, because viewers of different demographics will be watching a particular break at the
same time. Thus, at the moment of producing the schedule, various spots are competing for
the same break to reach different demographics. On the other hand, the advertisers impose
several business restrictions on the schedule, such as minimum separation time between spots
of the same product category, and uniform distribution of spots from the same brand.
We designed and implemented a combined solution based on mathematical program-
ming and time series forecasting methods to schedule the spots within breaks in a way that
maximizes the value of the audience. The scheduler arranges the spots at the level of posi-
tions inside the breaks, which is the maximum level of resolution. The optimization model is
a large scale integer programming model. We solve it close to optimality by using an ad-hoc
iterative procedure in less than 10 minutes, which is the time available to produce the daily
schedule. The schedules are of high quality as measured by standard business metrics and
when compared to the mathematical optimal bound. The models are packaged in a full com-
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mercial software that is used by leading television networks of the U.S. and India providing
increase in revenue of 3% to 5%.
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Chapter 3
Peer Effects In The Diffusion Of Solar Panels: A
Dynamic Discrete Choice Approach
3.1 Introduction
Installations of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United States have increased
rapidly in the last few years, primarily due to federal, state, and local level incentives. In
2006, the federal government established a 30% federal investment tax credit (ITC) that will
continue until 2019, when it is scheduled to decline. State support for PV diffusion is also
in a downturn. The most ambitious state PV policy, the California Solar Initiative (CSI),
is already in its last phase, and it is now available only through municipal service providers.
Simultaneously, lower electricity prices in several parts of the U.S., due to low natural gas
prices, have further curtailed the penetration of PV.
On the other hand, PV installation costs have dramatically decreased: Average resi-
dential prices were less than $5 per watt in 2013 compared to $10 per watt in 2007. Figure
3.1 shows the average residential price and existing incentives, in dollars per watt, from 1998
to 2012. We observe that both curves decline with almost the same slope. Therefore, the
net installation cost is relatively flat. However, the total annual new solar capacity exponen-
tially increases starting in 2010, as shown in Figure 3.1. How do these price and incentive
dynamics impact the diffusion of PV? In particular, among these shifts, how should electric
utilities rethink their PV programs when facing budgetary constraints? A better under-
standing of these issues may be used to design PV programs that targets specific segments
of the population.
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In this essay, we address these questions by studying the residential PV market in
Austin, Texas. We take advantage of a rich data set that includes the demographics, prop-
erty characteristics, and electricity consumption of each household. We combine these that
data with the PV adopter’s installation period, installation cost, rebate received, and sys-
tem attributes. We develop a dynamic discrete choice model (DDCM) that permits the
exploration of the effects of various policies and market shifts on the diffusion of PV. Our
model characterizes the factors behind PV diffusion at a consumer disaggregated level. It
models households as forward-looking consumers. In each period, a household that has not
yet adopted PV decides whether to adopt in that period or wait until the next period. In dy-
namic programming jargon, we formulated the household decision of adoption as an optimal
stopping problem.
In our formulation, the utility function of each household is a linear combination of the
net present value (NPV) of installing a PV system, peer effects, and household heterogeneity.
The NPV includes the cost of installation, local rebates, federal ITC, and electricity cost
savings. The peer effects constitute the households learning about PV technology from
neighbors who have installed PV systems. The household heterogeneity includes the diversity
of household’s characteristics that are constant in time and of which we do not have data;
for example, a predisposition to install renewable energy technology. For estimation of the
structural parameters that govern behavior, we design and implement a Bayesian Markov
Chain Monte Carlo method that allows us to handle heterogeneity in a dynamic context. We
can project the dynamics of the market and conduct a counterfactual analysis because our
model is structural, in the sense that its parameters capture the preferences of households
and quantifies spatial peer effects. This provides insights about which rebate schedules are
more efficient for accelerating the PV diffusion process.
The value of the estimated structural parameters shows that wealthy households are
more keen to install a PV system. The parameters also show that peer effects are significant
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and play an essential role in a household’s decision to adopt. Moreover, the marginal effect
of a new neighbor adopter is higher for households that are rural, then suburban and finally
urban. Furthermore, unobserved household heterogeneity is considerable, as measured by
the standard deviation of the random effects that capture heterogeneity.
For validation, we benchmarked our model against the classic Bass model, comparing
the predicted number of adopters per quarter in a 2 year test set. Our DDCM had a 6.4%
MAPE, which is much lower than the Bass model MAPE of around 80% on the test set. For
counterfactual policy analysis, we assumed a hypothetical situation in which the government
could adjust the rebate every quarter to match a pre-announced net cost of installation. The
net cost is equal to (price charged by the installer − rebate)×(1−ITC).
We created the following net cost scenarios over time: observed net cost as the base
case; constant net cost, stepwise decreasing net cost, and stepwise increasing net cost. Each
of these net cost-of-installation scenarios translates to rebate schedules that do not deviate
significantly from the actual rebate schedule. Subsequently, under each scenario we predict
the number of adopters and computed the budget spent on rebates. Scenarios that include a
constant or decreasing net cost of installation are Pareto superior to the base case: constant
or decreasing scenarios incentivize more adopters than the base case at lower total budget
spent in rebates by the government. A constant net cost incentivizes 0.21% more adopters
at a 2.65% smaller budget, and a decreasing net cost incentivizes 1.91% more adopters at a
8.46% lower budget. An increasing net cost incentivizes many more adopters than the base
case (i.e., 27.63% more adopters), but a much larger government budget spent (i.e., 55.81%
larger). A policymaker can use our framework to measure the potential effect of various
rebate schedules and adjust it according to her objective.
This essay is structured as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the related literature.
Section 3.3 describes the adoption decision process, the factors that enter into consideration,























Figure 3.1: Average installed price, incentives and new capacity addition of residential solar
panels (capacity lower than 10 kW installed) in the U.S. from 1998 to 2012. 2012 USD.
model. Section 3.5 characterizes the estimation method. Section 3.6 shows the estimation
results. Section 3.7 presents the counterfactual analysis, and Section 3.8 concludes the essay.
3.2 Literature Review
The dynamics of the diffusion of new technologies has been studied by researchers
from various social disciplines since the mid-20th century. Rogers [60] provides an overview
of the applications and methods. The literature on this topic is broad, so we will describe
the studies that are most relevant to our research; we will not provide an exhaustive review
of the literature on technology diffusion.
The seminal book by Rogers [61] classifies adopters into five categories according
to the timing of adoption: (1) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, (4) late
majority, and (5) laggards. These categories were defined based on the observation of many
empirical examples. Rogers’ theory argues that, with the exception of innovators, adopters
are persuaded by the influence of previous adopters. The theory also argues that the curve
of the cumulative number of adopters over time follows an S -shape. This curve initially
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appears to be linear with a small slope, but the curve then grows exponentially until the
number of adopters reaches the diffusion plateau.
Rogers’ theory inspires the influential differential equation of the Bass diffusion model
(Bass [7]), which formulates the conditional likelihood of adoption over time as the coeffi-
cient of innovation plus the coefficient of imitation multiplied by the function of cumulative
adopters. The Bass model has been used successfully to forecast the market penetrations
of a variety of products at an aggregate level. Over the years, many refinements have been
produced, including decision variables (e.g., optimal pricing policies, advertising), technol-
ogy innovation, spatial dimension, and network structure (e.g., Bass et al. [8], Van den Bulte
and Stremersch [77], Van den Bulte [78], Van den Bulte and Joshi [79], Garber et al. [29],
Sood et al. [71, 72], Dover et al. [27], Goldenberg et al. [32, 33], [41], Hu and Van den Bulte
[38]). For an in-depth review, see Chandrasekaran and Tellis [20] or Peres et al. [51]. The
follow-up approach of Shaikh et al. [65] embeds the Bass model inside a network structure.
Agent-based models (ABMs) constitute a second proposed approach that includes
individual decision-making and heterogeneity. These models are microsimulations of the
behavior of adopters. Typically, the agents’ decision-making rules follow a particular social
behavioral theory, and the parameters of the simulation are calibrated from the observed
real-world diffusion process (e.g., Kiesling et al. [43], Rahmandad and Sterman [54]). For the
PV diffusion context, Palmer et al. [49] use an ABM in the case of Italy. Rai and Robinson
[57] study the diffusion of PV in Austin, Texas, by modeling the agents according to the
theory of planned behavior Ajzen [3]. We use some elements of this work, which we describe
in the following sections.
With a reduced-form specification, Bollinger and Gillingham [15] use data from the
California Solar Initiative (CSI) to estimate the probability per ZIP code that a household
would adopt a PV system. Their model includes peer effects, and it and provides the
theoretical base needed to manage the “reflection problem” of Manski [46]. Essentially, if
61
the data allow us to disentangle the period of the adoption decision from the period of PV
installation, then it is possible to infer who influences whom.
Lobel and Perakis [45] use a structural model to analyze the aggregate supply and
demand equilibrium of the German PV market. Our research contributes to this stream
of work in that we can incorporate in a structural model the peer effects at an individual
level. The advantage of using structural modeling is that the formulation reflects the agents’
preferences; therefore, the estimated parameters are not dependent on the realization of the
variables (e.g., as prices) but only on the decisions made by the agents. This approach allows
us to conduct a robust counterfactual analysis.
Our framework follows the structural econometrics methodology initiated by Rust
[62]. For a review of this type of work, see, for example, Aguirregabiria and Mira [2]. For
estimation, we designed a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method based on
Imai et al. [40] and Norets [48] as described in Section 3.5. Our work is one of the very
first that successfully adapts Imai et al. [40] and Norets [48] to a real-world context. From
a modeling perspective, our formulation resembles the technology adoption models studied
by Ulu and Smith [76] and Smith and Ulu [69, 70]. These authors study the theoretical
optimality conditions for the time of adoption under functional assumptions.
3.3 Diffusion and Adoption Decision Process
An interdisciplinary decade-long study of PV diffusion accomplished by the Energy
Systems Transformation Research Group of The University of Texas at Austin (see Rai and
McAndrews [55], Rai and Robinson [56] and references therein) deduces that a household
takes into account the following factors when deciding to adopt.
The first factor is the future cash flow from producing electricity from the PV system.
The second factor is a consideration of the dynamic trade-offs between installing the sys-
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tem today (and taking advantage of the available government incentives) versus installing in
the future, which may offer fewer incentives. Furthermore, potential adopters consider the
dynamic trade-offs between installing the current technology versus waiting for technology
improvements to become available, which could offer lower hardware, operation, and main-
tenance costs. And the third factor is the predisposition to install a PV system. A potential
adopter’s predisposition changes based on the household’s awareness level about the tech-
nology and its reliability. We hypothesize that for a particular household, this predisposition
increases as the potential adopter sees more households with PV systems. Observing house-
holds with PV systems affects potential observers through peer influence (both conscious and
unconscious) and because each observed PV system is a signal to the potential adopter that
PV technology is reliable. Moreover, the nearer a new installation, the higher the probability
that the household will observe the newly installed PV. Therefore, the geographic proximity
of new installations plays a significant role in the adoption decision process.
Another interpretation of new installations has a parallel with advertising. Each
new installation that the household sees serves as a new advertisement. The more these
“ads” the potential adopter views, the more likely she is to decide to adopt a system. For
a household that has never seen a solar panel, a PV system could appear unattractive or
unusual. However, as the potential adopter sees more systems installed, she becomes more
accustomed to their appearance. Eventually, she may develop an interest in this technology.
To model the decision process and empirically estimate the relevance of each factor,
we propose a discrete choice dynamic programming model in which the household makes
optimal decisions in each period. This approach is superior to a reduced-form analysis in
which the adoption is a function of relevant variables, because the estimated parameters
do not depend on the actual realization of the data. Therefore, it is possible to conduct a
counterfactual analysis of different paths of incentives and technologies.
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3.4 Dynamic Discrete Choice Model
We index the households by i and denote by M the set of households that have market
potential. We classify the households into two dimensions: the economic set of segments E
and the geographic set of segments G. Let ei ∈ E be the household’s economic segment
and let gi ∈ G be the household’s geographic segment. Time periods of data available are
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} quarters. The households that adopted before or at time t are placed in the
set Mt ⊂M, and the time of adoption is ti for all i ∈MT .
At period t, if household i already adopted, then the household receives bill credits
for the electricity generated from its PV system. On the other hand, if the household has
not yet adopted, it must decide whether to do so. If the household decides to adopt, then
the system is installed, and it starts to produce electricity at time t+ 1 until the end of the
system’s lifespan (which is assumed to be 20 years, or L = 80 quarters).
Given household i’s characteristics, the household installs a system of size wi kW that
generates qit (kWh per kW installed) at time t, calculated based on site-specific irradiance.
This series is seasonal due to sunlight variability through the year. Furthermore, household
i observes the following state variables: the installation price of PV pt ($ per kW), the
incentive or rebate offered by the utility rt ($ per kW), and the residential solar incentive
tax credit ITCt(%) provided by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
1. The ITCt is based on
the household’s investment—i.e., if i installs a PV system at time t, i would have to pay
(pt − rt)(1− ITCt) ($ per kW). Because ITCt has been constant over time, and because the
final net cost of the PV system is the most important factor for the household, we define the
per kW net cost of installation, ct = (pt− rt)(1− ITCt), as the data that households observe
and consider. Figure 3.2(b) displays the net cost of installation over time. Finally, the
household also observes the residential energy solar rate, vt ($ per kWh), which corresponds
1Energy investment tax credit: http://energy.gov/savings/business-energy-investment-tax-credit-itc.
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(a) Accumulated Number of Adopters. (b) Average Price, Rebate and Net Cost before ITC.

























Figure 3.2: Accumulated adopters and cost in Austin, Texas, 2004–2013.
Note. Price per quarter is the average installation price that installers charge to households who adopted in
each quarter. Rebate is the incentive that Austin Energy provided per quarter, and Net Cost is Price minus
Rebate. Each adopter also obtained the federal incentive tax credit (ITC) of 30% between 2004 and 2013.
Source: Austin Energy.
to bill credits for the electricity generated by a PV system.
Additionally, we model the influence of peer effects as follows: At time t, there is an
installed base Mt−1 = {j ∈M : tj ≤ t−1}, which consists of all the households that decided
to adopt in or before time t − 1. Notice that the adopters who decide to adopt at time
t− 1 have their PV systems installed at time t. The installed base is known to us, but the
household observes some of the installed systems that we assume influence the predisposition
of the household to install a PV system. For each household i, we divide Mt−1 into subsets
of households located a given distance range from i. Let D = {0 < d1 < d2 < . . . < dD} be
the set of discrete distances used for the division (e.g., 0.25 miles, 0.5 miles, 1.0 miles). Let
Hilt ⊂Mt−1 be the set of households located within a distance range (dl−1, dl] from household
i, for all l = 1, . . . , D. Let hilt = |Hilt| and hit = {hi1t, . . . , hiDt}. A similar construction of
rings is used by Graziano and Gillingham [35]. For a summary of the notation see Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Dynamic discrete choice model notation.
Indices and Sets
i ∈M Set of market potential households.
e ∈ E, g ∈ G Sets of economic and geographic segments.
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} Quarters of data available. T = 39.
dl ∈ D Set of discrete distances to define neighborhoods by distance radius rings.
D = {0 < d1 < d2 < . . . < dD}.
Data
wi PV size (kW) that i would install.
qit Electricity that would be generated (kWh per kW installed) by household
i’s PV in period t (calculated based on site electricity irradiance). This
series is seasonal due to the sunlight variability throughout the year.
vt Residential solar rate ($/kWh). Bill credits for electricity produced by PV
at time t.
ei ∈ E Economic segment of household i.
gi ∈ G Geographic segment of household i.
ti If i decided to adopt during the period of study, then ti is the time of
adoption. The PV system is installed in the next period. If i did not
decide to adopt, then ti =∞. This applies to all i ∈M.
Mt ⊆M Set of households that adopted at or before time t for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Mt = {i ∈M : ti ≤ t}, therefore M1 ⊆ . . . ⊆MT .
McT Set of households in the market that have not yet adopted at time T .
McT = M \MT .
β Household discount factor.
L Lifespan of a PV system (20 years × 4 quarters per year = 80 quarters).
Decision variable
ait ∈ {0, 1} Adoption decision at time t of household i. Equals 1 if household adopts
and 0 otherwise.
State variables
Variables observable to both the household and the researcher:
ct PV installation net cost ($/kW) at time t. ct = (pt − rt)(1− ITCt).
Hilt The set of households that have already installed and are located at a radius
distance d ∈ (dl−1, dl] from household i. For all l = 1, . . . , D. Also, let the
number of adopters hilt = |Hilt|, and hit = {hi1t, . . . , hiDt}.
Observable variables to the household, but not to the researcher:
ξi Additive utility component that reflects individual heterogeneity constant
over time. It is a random effect. ξi ∼ N(0, σ(ξ)).
εiat Additive utility component for choosing adoption decision a that varies over
time.
Structural parameters to estimate
ρ Constant term of the utility function.
αe Preference of segment e for economic benefit of solar, for all e ∈ E.
γgl Marginal utility of installations that are within radius distance d ∈ (dl−1, dl]
for all l = 1 . . . , D and segment g ∈ G. And let γg = {γg1, . . . , γgD}.
σ(ξ) Standard deviation of the random effect ξ.
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3.4.1 Per-Period Utility
We formulate the per-period utility using a random utility model. Let ait be the
decision variable equal to 1 if household i adopts, or 0 if the household does not adopt.
The components that play a role in the utility function are cash flow, peer effects, and
heterogeneity between households. We assume that the utility has an additive form composed
of the following six components.
The first component is a constant base utility ρ that represents the homogeneous
utility of adopting. The second is the net present value from the PV system NPVit(ct)
multiplied by the preference for economic benefit of solar αei , which we consider to be the
same for all households in the same economic segment ei ∈ E. NPVit(ct) equals to the net
present value of the bill credits for the electricity generated from the PV system minus the
net cost of installation. The third component consists of the peer effects: Each household
at a distance between (dl−1, dl] influences i by γgil, where gi is the geographic segment
gi ∈ G. Let γsi = {γgi1, . . . , γgiD}. Therefore, the total peer effect influence is γ ′sihit. The
fourth variable ξi is the random effect per household, constant over time, that represents the
heterogeneity between households not observable to us. This variable can include attitudes
toward renewable energy and various idiosyncrasies of the potential adopter. We assume
that ξi is a normal random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation σ(ξ), and we
estimate this variable along with the other structural parameters. The sixth component is
the variable εi1t, which is also observable to the household but not to us, which we assume
it is an i.i.d. random variable standard extreme value type 1 distributed. Therefore, the
utility for adopting is
ui1t(ct,hit, ξi, εi1t; ρ, αei ,γgi) = ρ+ αeiNPVit(ct) + γ
′
si
hit + ξi + εi1t. (3.1)
By assuming that εi1t is a random variable standard extreme value type I distributed,
we impose that its variance is π2/6; therefore, all the parameters to estimate (ρ, αei ,γsi)
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must be at that scale. If we normalize the utility by any of the parameters (e.g., αei) we
affect the scale of εi1t, which would become another parameter to estimate.
We compute the expected profit from the system as follows: Household i pays a net
cost ct, and the household’s PV produces electricity from t+ 1 until the end of its lifespan,
t + 1 + L. Hence, at every period t + 1 ≤ τ ≤ t + 1 + L, the household receives vτqiτ bill
credits, which we assume are known to the household. We assume a discount factor of β.








If the household decides not to adopt, it obtains a utility component εi0t, which is
observable to the household but not to us, and we assume it is also an i.i.d. random variable
standard extreme value type I distributed.
ui0t(εi0t) = εi0t (3.3)
3.4.2 Optimal Adoption Decision
Let εit = (εi0t, εi1t), and let θ = (ρ,α,γ) be the full vector of structural parameters.
Then, the decision problem of household i can be formulated as a dynamic programing
model. The value function of household i at time t is
Vit(ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ) = max
a∈{0,1}
Viat(ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ), (3.4)
where Viat is the choice specific value function for making the decision a ∈ {0, 1}:
Vi0t(ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ) = ui0t(εi0t) + βEc,h,ε [Vit+1(c,h, ξ, ε;θ)|ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ]
= εi0t + βEc,h,ε [Vit+1(c,h, ξ, ε;θ)|ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ] . (3.5)
Vi1t(ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ) = ui1t(ct,hit, ξi, εi1t;θ)
= ρ+ αeiNPVit(ct) + γ
′
gi
hit + ξi + εi1t. (3.6)
Therefore, household i will adopt at t if Vi1t(ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ) ≥ Vi0t(ct,hit, ξi, εit;θ).
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3.4.3 State Variables and Transition Functions
Variables observable at time t:





cct + εc, εc ∼ N(0, σ2εc), (3.7)
where λ0c , λ
1
c and σεc are computed from historical data. Figure 3.2(b) presents the time
series ct from Q1-2001 to Q4-2013.
Variables observable only to households at time t:
Two variables are observable only to households. The first variable is the heterogene-
ity among households ξi which is constant over time. This variable could include attitudes
toward renewable energy or idiosyncrasy. The second variable is the latent utility that is
variable among households, time, and decision of adoption, εiat. We model this as an i.i.d.
standard extreme value type I distribution.
3.5 Bayesian Estimation
For estimation, we designed a Bayesian MCMC algorithm based on a combination
of the methods developed by Imai et al. [40] and Norets [48]. This algorithm conducts a
Metropolis–Hastings with a Gibbs sampler, in which at iteration r it draws a candidate
parameter θ(r) = {ρ(r),α(r),γ(r)}; a random grid of size J , {cj(r)}Jj=1; and it approximates







(r)) be the ap-








(r)) be the approximation of the value function at iteration r given











be the approximation of the expecta-
tion of the value function in the next period at iteration r. Then the algorithm in Table 3.2
69































































(r)) = ρ(r) + α(r)ei NPVit(c
j(r)




























































The full market size is too large to be handled computationally in the likelihood function. We
aggregate the households that did not yet adopt into clusters of households that share similar
characteristics (specifically, home market value, size of the house, tree-cover, and irradiance
received) per block group using the k-means clustering technique in order to reduce the
computational complexity of the estimation algorithm.
Figure 3.3 shows the households before and after aggregation. Panels 3.3a and 3.3b
show the Austin Energy service area, in which the red dots represent the adopters during
the period of analysis. Each black dot represents the following: A potential adopter in Panel
3.3a, and a cluster of potential adopters in Panel 3.3b. Panel 3.3c presents a zoom into a
specific block group in which each black dot symbolizes a potential adopter and each green
dot represents a cluster of potential adopters. Then, in the likelihood function we weight
each cluster by the number of potential adopters that belongs to that cluster.
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Table 3.2: Algorithm MCMC estimation.
Input : Data: household characteristics, time of adoption, costs, value of solar. β discount factor. R
MCMC iterations. shape, base scale, σρ, σα and σγ hyperparameters to control acceptance rate
and convergence of MCMC.
Output : θ̄ = (ρ̄, ᾱ, γ̄, σ̄ν) posterior mean of structural parameters. For the sake of exposition, assume only
one economic and one geography segment.
Variables : ρ(r), α(r), γ(r), ν
(r)
i accepted values at iteration r. ρ
′, α′, γ′, ν′i proposal. ρ
0, α0, γ0, ν0i = 0
for r ∈ 1 to R do
// ********** HOUSEHOLDS RANDOM EFFECTS **********
c, f = SimulateCostFunction()
for i ∈ Households do
Êi = EmaxApprox(V̂i, f)
li = LogLik(ρ
(r−1), α(r−1), γ(r−1), ν(r−1)i , Êi, Data, β, c, f)









ν′i ∼ Normal(0, σν)
l′i = LogLik(ρ
(r−1), α(r−1), γ(r−1), ν′i, Êi, Data, β, c, f)
u ∼ U(0, 1)










(r−1), α(r−1), γ(r−1), ν(r)i , Êi, Data, β, c, f)
// ********** BASE UTILITY **********
c, f = SimulateCostFunction()
for i ∈ Households do
Êi = EmaxApprox(V̂i, f)
li = LogLik(ρ




ρ′ ∼ Normal(ρ(r−1), σρ)
for i ∈ Households do l′i = LogLik(ρ′, α(r−1), γ(r−1), ν
(r)




u ∼ U(0, 1)
if log(u) ≤ min(l′ − l, 0) then ρ(r) = ρ′ else ρ(r) = ρ(r−1)
for i ∈ Households do V̂i = VApprox(ρ(r), α(r−1), γ(r−1), ν(r)i , Êi, Data, β, c, f)
// ********** ECONOMIC FACTOR **********
c, f = SimulateCostFunction()
for i ∈ Households do
Êi = EmaxApprox(V̂i, f)
li = LogLik(ρ




α′ ∼ Normal(α(r−1), σα)
for i ∈ Households do l′i = LogLik(ρ(r), α′, γ(r−1), ν
(r)




u ∼ U(0, 1)
if log(u) ≤ min(l′ − l, 0) then α(r) = α′ else α(r) = α(r−1)
for i ∈ Households do V̂i = VApprox(ρ(r), α(r), γ(r−1), ν(r)i , Êi, Data, β, c, f)
// ********** PEER EFFECTS **********
c, f = SimulateCostFunction()
for i ∈ Households do
Êi = EmaxApprox(V̂i, f)
li = LogLik(ρ




γ′ ∼ Normal(γ(r−1), σγ)
for i ∈ Households do l′i = LogLik(ρ(r), α(r), γ′, ν
(r)




u ∼ U(0, 1)
if log(u) ≤ min(l′ − l, 0) then γ(r) = γ′ else γ(r) = γ(r−1)
for i ∈ Households do V̂i = VApprox(ρ(r), α(r), γ(r), ν(r)i , Êi, Data, β, c, f)




(a) No aggregation. (b) Aggregation. (c) Example of households block
group aggregation.
Figure 3.3: Solar adopters and non-adopters until 2013.
Source: Austin Energy. Black dots represents non-adopters and red dots are adopters in the period of
analysis. The use of clusters on the likelihood function is an idea inspired by the weighted exogenous
sampling maximum likelihood method of Manski and Lerman [47].
3.6 Estimation Results
The utility function presented in Equation (3.1) has four dimensions that can be ad-
justed to test robustness, improve forecast accuracy, and refine policy recommendations via
counterfactual analysis: (a) the inclusion or exclusion of peer effects, (b) the inclusion or ex-
clusion of random effects, (c) economic segment cohorts, and (d) radial distance brackets (if
peer effects are admitted). We assume the set of geographic segments defined by the Claritas
PRIZM segmentation: urban, suburban, and rural segments. For each model specification,
we estimate the corresponding parameters using the Bayesian method explained in Section
3.5. We compare the models using two main metrics: in-sample deviance information cri-
terion (DIC)2, and out-of-sample mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). The dimensions
values that we consider are:
(a) Peer effects. With or without peer effects.
2DIC = −2 log `(θ̄) + 2p, where, (̄.) is the mean operator, and p is the effective number of parameters.
This can be computed as pD = 2(log `(θ̄)− log `(θ)) or pV = 2var (log `(θ)). [31, 73]
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(b) Random effects. Nonrandom effects (NRE) or random effects (RE).
(c) Economic segment cohorts. We proxy the cohorts by the market value of the
houses. We select four different sets of cutoff values (in thousands of dollars) to define
the segments: (0,
Inf); (0, 300, Inf ); (0, 300, 600, Inf ); and (0, 150, 300, 500, Inf ). Inf has a very large
value.
(d) Radial distance brackets. The cutoffs (in miles) that we consider are: (0, 0.5); (0,
0.5, 1); (0, 0.5, Inf ); (0, 1, Inf ); and (0, Inf ). Inf correspond to the limits that Austin
Energy serves and where the PV rebates are available. This dimension applies only for
models with peer effects.
We divide the data in training set and test set as follows. Let T̂ < T , a time period
before the last observed period. The set of adopters until time T̂ is MT̂ = {i ∈M : ti ≤ T̂}.
We fit the model using the adopters in MT̂ , then compute the out-of-sample predictive fit
for the households in Mc
T̂
= M \MT̂ . Let S simulations draws {θsT̂}
S
s=1 of the parameters,
fitting the model to the adopters in MT̂ . Let Nt be the number of adopters at time t. Let
Mct be the set of households who have not adopted until time t. Then, the foretasted number

















Let Q := {2011-Q1, . . . , 2013-Q2} be the set of quarters to predict.
Table 3.3 presents a summary of the various model specifications and their error met-
rics. DIC is in the range of 24,700 to 27,893, without distinguishing a clear best model. On
the other hand, MAPE fluctuates between 6.40% and 42.84%, which indicates that model
VI-RE is the best, with minimum MAPE. Before discussing that model in detail, an exami-
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nation of these dimensions reveals some important insights. In the following paragraphs, all
percentage numbers refers to MAPE unless it is stated otherwise.
First, the models without peer effects are the worst. That is, specification XII-NRE
has 42.84% and specification XII-RE has 41.88%, versus the closest model with peer effects
IX-NRE, which has 36.74%. Therefore, peer effects are an important factor in the decision
to adopt.
Second, among the models that include peer effects, the models RE dominates models
NRE. The exception is Model III, in which III-RE 10.20% is worse than III-NRE 9.15%.
Third, regarding the economic segment cohorts, the optimal segmentation is to divide
the households into two cohorts around the $300,000 cutoff value. One cohort (0, Inf ) is
dominated in every comparison versus two cohorts. For example, when we control for radial
distance brackets at (0, 0.5) and RE, model I-RE has 11.03% versus model IV-RE , which
has 10.95%. On the other hand, more than two cohorts is worse than only two cohorts.
Fourth, radial distance brackets (0, 1, Inf ) dominates all other partitions of the
distance space, when controlling for home market value cohorts and the inclusion or exclusion
of random effects.
This analysis concludes that the best model is composed of (a) two cohorts of market
value divided at the $300,000 line, (b) radial distance brackets up to one mile and more than
one mile, and (c) the inclusion of random effects. Model VI-RE meets these criteria, and it
has a MAPE of 6.40%. Table 3.4 presents the estimated parameters of this model, which are
equal to the posterior mean of the MCMC distribution, the Bayesian 95% credible intervals
of the parameters, Geweke p-value to test convergence, and the acceptance rate.
The base utility ρ is a reference at which all the households initially value PV. On
model VI-RE this base utility equals −6.83860. That is the log odds of a hypothetical
household with NPV equal to zero, no adopter neighbors, and heterogeneity also equal to
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Table 3.3: Summary of models and metrics.
α γ DIC MAPE (%)




NRE RE NRE RE
I (0, Inf) (0, 0.5) 27,893 27,020 13.93 11.03
II (0, Inf) (0, 0.5, 1) 26,441 26,330 25.24 21.76
III (0, Inf) (0, 1, Inf) 26,091 25,907 9.15 10.20
IV (0, 300, Inf) (0, 0.5) 26,443 26,698 10.95 7.94
V (0, 300, Inf) (0, 0.5, 1) 26,921 26,793 21.56 18.46
VI (0, 300, Inf) (0, 1, Inf) 26,242 26,260 7.56 6.40
VII (0, 300, Inf) (0, 0.5, Inf) 26,593 26,646 12.22 11.80
VIII (0, 300, 600, Inf) (0, 0.5) 27,044 27,055 24.89 22.16
IX (0, 300, 600, Inf) (0, 0.5, 1) 26,681 26,524 36.74 32.58
X (0, 150, 300, 500, Inf) (0, Inf) 24,838 24,700 21.27 20.60
XI (0, 150, 300, 500, Inf) (0, 1, Inf) 26,327 25,750 15.29 14.79
XII (0, 150, 300, 500, Inf) No Peer Effects 24,875 24,760 42.84 41.88
Note. NRE: model without random effects. RE: model with random effects.
0. The odds of such a hypothetical household adopting PV is exp(−6.83860) = 0.00107160,
and the probability of adopting is exp(−6.83860)/(1 + exp(−6.83860)) = 0.00107046. The
households whose houses have a market price that exceeds $300,000 finds more value in a
PV system than households with houses that have a lower market price. The parameter
α[300K,Inf ) is 0.00056 versus α[0,300K) at 0.00028 level. This difference reflects that households
with houses of higher value want to invest more in their houses than the owners of less
expensive properties.
Next, for all geographic segments, the peer effect γ of the closest installations (i.e.,
less than a mile away) is much higher than the effect of further installations. For urban
locations, γ.,urban is 0.03374 versus −0.00026. For suburban locations, γ.,suburban is 0.04702
versus 0.00005. For rural locations, γ.,rural is 0.13716 versus −0.00033. This negative values
on urban and rural households more than a mile away are very close to zero and have a
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ρ −6.83860 (−6.90445,−6.77342) 0.3641 0.23
α[0,300K) 0.00028 (0.00025,0.00030) 0.8520 0.26
α[300K,Inf) 0.00056 (0.00053,0.00059) 0.9662 0.25
γ[0,1.0),urban 0.03374 (0.02751,0.04098) 0.5672 0.26
γ[1.0,Inf),urban −0.00026 (−0.00044,−0.00008) 0.4800 0.26
γ[0,1.0),suburban 0.04702 (0.04442,0.04925) 0.9358 0.26
γ[1.0,Inf),suburban 0.00005 (−0.00006,0.00015) 0.1299 0.26
γ[0,1.0),rural 0.13716 (0.12206,0.15311) 0.9232 0.30
γ[1.0,Inf),rural −0.00033 (−0.00053,−0.00010) 0.9330 0.25
σ(ξ) 0.05118 (0.04874,0.05404) 0.3082 −
Note. The best model is VI-RE. DIC = 26260 . Geweke tests for non-convergence of posterior mean
estimates. Convergence is rejected for significant p-value. Acceptance rate is adjusted to be near 0.24.
“Optimal efficiency” is achieved at an acceptance rate around that value (Roberts et al. [59]).
very small magnitude in comparison to the other parameters. That negative value is not an
indication of a negative effect; rather, it shows almost zero effect. Comparing the peer effect
of close installations across geographic segments, γ[0,1.0),rural > γ[0,1.0),suburban > γ[0,1.0),urban,
which indicates that rural households are influenced the most positively by each new close
installation, and urban households are the least influenced.
Finally, the standard deviation of the random effect σ(ξ) is significant (0.05118),
but it has a smaller magnitude than the base utility, the economic effect, and the peer
effects component of the utility function. This reflects that endogenous differences between
households are significant for the decision to adopt, but with less magnitude than the other
components of the utility function. The plots in Figure 3.4 show the MCMC trace and
density plots of the parameters. We observe consistent convergence for all the parameters
as well as the bell shape of the density plots.
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(a) ρ constant term of the utility function.
(b) α preference for economic benefit of solar.
(c) γ peer effects.
(d) ξ random effects.
Figure 3.4: MCMC trace plots of best model structural parameters.
Note. Best model is Model VI-RE.
3.6.1 Comparison with Bass Model
As a benchmark, we estimated a classic Bass model [7] at the aggregate level, and
we forecasted the number of adopters in out-of-sample quarters. Let At be the number of
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(a) Quarterly number of adopters and Bass model
prediction.
(b) Accumulated number of adopters and Bass
model prediction.
Figure 3.5: Bass model benchmark.
Note. Left panel displays the observed number of adopters per quarter and the predicted by the Bass
model. Right panel displays the cumulative number. The MAPE for quarters Q := {2011-Q1, . . . , 2013-Q2}
is 83.72%.
adopters in period t, |M| the market size, p the coefficient of innovation, and q the coefficient









We use a nonlinear least squares regression to estimate the parameters of this model. We
obtain p = 0.000139 and q = 0.098965. Figure 3.5 displays both the predicted number and
the actual number of adopters in quarters Q := {2011-Q1, . . . , 2013-Q2}. The MAPE on this
data set is 83.72%, dramatically underperforming the best DDCM VI-RE, which has a 6.40%
MAPE. The Bass model is performing poorly because the diffusion process on this data set
is in a very, early stage and it does not yet attain the S -shape that the Bass equation fits.
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3.7 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
Now that we have estimated the structural parameters, we can simulate the diffusion
path under alternative scenarios of the exogenous state variables or the parameters that
can be adjusted. In our model, a policymaker can control the ITC, the bill credits for the
electricity produced (vt), and the rebate schedule (rt). In this essay, we focus on adjusting
the rebate schedule. On the other hand, the state variable hit is endogenous because it
depends on the decision to adopt made by the neighbors of household i before period t. It
is necessary to compute the diffusion equilibrium to obtain a transition function for hit and
compute the probabilities of adoption in every period for each household under a particular
counterfactual.
3.7.1 Equilibrium and Simulation
Let θ̄ = (ρ̄, ᾱ, γ̄) be the posterior mean of the structural parameters. Given a specific
scenario to simulate, we compute the value function and the probabilities of adoption using
the fitted value iteration algorithm (see, for example, Stachurski [74] in Section 10.2.3) and
an outer loop to compute the equilibrium. For each household i and period t, we estimate
the value function for every possible value of the state variable hit = 1, . . . , ĥi, where ĥi
is the number of neighbors around household i. We assume a simple transition function
hit+1 = λihit
3. We estimate λi at each iteration of the outer loop until the number of
adopters per period converges. Initially, we set λi = 1 for all i.
For the last period T , the value function is computed using the Bellman operator,
3We experimented with more sophisticated transition functions (e.g., the Bass model), but the simulation
results did not change, and the computation time increases because of the regressions on the outer loop.
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iterating until convergence when the fix point of the value function is reached:
ViT (cT , h, ξi, εi; θ̄) = max
{
Vi1T (cT , h, ξi, εi; θ̄),Vi0T (cT , h, ξi, εi; θ̄)
}
ViT (cT , h, ξi; θ̄) = exp
(













βViT (cT , λih, ξi; θ̄)
))
.
We estimate the fix point by computing the convergence sequence V 0i , V
1
i , . . . , Vi:
Initialization: V 0i ∈ R, k = 0


















Then, we compute the probability of adoption as










βViT (cT , λih, ξi; θ̄)− Vi1T (cT , h, ξi; θ̄)
) .
For period t < T , the value function can be computed using the backward recursion:
Vit(ct, h, ξi, εi; θ̄) = max
{
Vi1t(ct, h, ξi, εi; θ̄),Vi0t(ct, h, ξi, εi; θ̄)
}
Vit(ct, h, ξi; θ̄) = exp
(













βVit+1(ct+1, λih, ξi; θ̄)
))
,
and the probability of adoption is










βVit+1(ct+1, λih, ξi; θ̄)− Vi1t(ct, h, ξi; θ̄)
) . (3.8)
By using the probabilities of adoption per household, it is possible to simulate and
compute statistics over many simulations. However, that process is computationally in-
tensive. Alternatively, we compute the expected number of adopters directly using the
probabilities of adoption.
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We must treat two caveats carefully. The first caveat is the use of clusters. Let us
recall that a cluster is a group of households from the same block group that shares sim-
ilar characteristics (i.e., home market value, size of the house, tree cover, and irradiance
received). In the estimation process described in Section 3.5, the clusters are treated as
individual households, except in the likelihood function. The likelihood of each cluster is
weighted by the number of households that belong to it. Equivalently, in the simulation,
we degroup each cluster by the number of households that belong to that cluster. Next,
we assign a probability of adoption to each household equal to the probability of the cor-
responding cluster. Then, we simulate the decision-making process of each household per
period, considering the installation net cost and the adopters from previous periods.
As we stated earlier in this section, the second caveat is that the state variable of
neighbors that have adopted previously must be found in equilibrium. For this purpose, we
iterate the simulation until the number of adopters converges using the number of adopters
from the previous iteration to regress hit+1 = λihit. The algorithm in Table 3.5 describes
the steps of the simulation. In this way, we assume that households project the equilibrium
number of adopters, and households do not consider the actions of potential adopters in the
actual period, as in the concept of oblivious equilibrium of Weintraub et al. [82, 83]. Figure
3.6 shows an example of how the equilibrium is reached via the outer loop.
3.7.2 Policy Analysis
We present two counterfactuals in this essay. We alter the net cost in the first counter-
factual, and we alter the rebate in the second. We start with the ideal hypothetical situation
of changing the net cost, because that variable plays a direct role on the utility function
defined in Equation (3.1). However, in the real world, a policymaker can adjust only the
rebate. Thus, we present that analysis in the altered rebate counterfactual below.
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Table 3.5: Algorithm expected number of adopters in equilibrium.
Input : Schedule of net cost ct, t = 1, . . . , T .
Output : Expected number of adopters for periods t = 1, . . . , T .
Initialization: No household have adopted in period t = 1. Iteration k ← 1. λi = 1 for each household i
while Number of adopters do not converge do
for i ∈ Households do
household i adopt in t = 1 with probability Pi1 = pi(ct, 0, ξi; θ̄)
for i ∈ Households do // it is necesary to finish previous loop
h
(k)
i1 = expected number of adopters at a 1-mile radius of household i at the end of period t = 1
A
(k)
1 = expected number of adopters in period 1 of iteration k
for t ∈ 2 to T do
for i ∈ Households that have not yet adopted do
household i adopt in period t with probability Pit = pi(ct, h
(k)
it−1, ξi; θ̄) ∗ (1−
∑t−1
τ=1 Piτ )
for i ∈ Households do
h
(k)
it = expected number of adopters at a 1-mile radius of household i at the end of period t
A
(k)
t = expected number of adopters in period t of iteration k
for i ∈ Households do





k ← k + 1;




















Figure 3.6: Example of equilibrium reached via outer loop.
3.7.2.1 Net Cost Counterfactual
We compare two scenarios to the base case of a smooth average net cost of installation.
The metrics that we evaluated are (1) the expected cumulative number of adopters by quarter
and (2) the expected budget spent on rebates by quarter. We designed the counterfactual
scenarios as follows. Assume the hypothetical scenario in which the government, which
provides the rebates, announces a scheduled net cost of installation c̃ = {c̃1, . . . , c̃T} in
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$/kW for the period of evaluation, Q1-2004 to Q3-2013. Recall that the net cost per kW,
ct, is equal to the price of installation, pt, minus the rebate incentive, rt, discounted by
the federal incentive tax credit, ITCt, which was 30% during the period of evaluation, ct =
(pt − rt)(1 − ITCt). Therefore, in this hypothetical situation, the government adjusts the
rebate to satisfy the announced schedule as r̃t = pt − (c̃t/(1− ITCt)).
The net cost of installation scenarios are (i) constant net cost; (ii) stepwise increasing
net cost, and (iii) stepwise decreasing net cost. We set the constant net cost equal to the
average real net cost, $1,640. The stepwise curves are constructed using a factor in {0.2, 0.3}
such that minimum cost = mean cost×(1−factor), maximum cost = mean cost×(1+factor),
and using six evenly distributed steps from minimum cost to maximum cost. For example,
for factor 0.3 the minimum cost is $1, 640 × (1 − 0.3) = $1, 148, and the maximum cost is
$1, 640× (1 + 0.3) = $2, 132.
In Figure 3.7, Plots (a1) and (b1) present the net cost curves per quarter. We name
the scenario in which the factor is 0.2 the narrow range scenario, and the wide range scenario
has a factor of 0.3. These same plots show the constant net cost scenario and the smoothed
base case scenario. Plots (a2) and (b2) show the rebate schedules that resulted from adjusting
to the net cost. Notice that the scenario rebate schedules are not far from the actual rebate
schedule. Plots (a3) and (b3) present the accumulated number of adopters, and Plots (a4)
and (b4) present the accumulated budget spent.
Let us focus our attention on the wide range scenario. Plot (b3) shows that at the end
of Q3-2013, the actual number of adopters is 2,722, and the predicted number of adopters
with the smooth base case is 2,877. With constant net cost, the number of adopters is 2,883,
a 0.21% increase with respect to the base case. With decreasing net cost, the number of
adopters is 2,932, a 1.91% increase with respect to the base case; and with increasing net
cost the number of adopters is 3,672, a raise of 27.63% with respect to the base case.
Observing the accumulated budget spent on rebates in Plot (b4), we see that the
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Table 3.6: Percent difference in number of adopters and budget spent for net cost scenarios.
Net Cost Scenario Adopters % difference Budget Spent % difference
Constant 0.21% −2.65%
Decreasing Narrow 0.31% −10.38%
Decreasing Wide 1.91% −8.46%
Increasing Narrow 11.51% 26.22%
Increasing Wide 27.63% 55.81%
Note. The base case predicts 2,877 adopters and a total budget spent of $24.94 million at the end of Q2-2013.
We observe that constant and stepwise decreasing net cost scenarios incentivize more adopters at a lower
total budget. Stepwise increasing net cost incentivizes many more adopters but with a higher total budget.
actual budget spent is $26.24 million and the predicted budget spent with the smooth base
case scenario is $24.94 million. In the constant net cost scenario, the budget spent is $24.28
million (i.e, 2.65% less than the base case). With decreasing net cost the budget spent
is $22.83 million (i.e, 8.46% less than the base case). And with increasing net cost the
budget spent is $38.86 dollars (i.e, 55.81% more than the base case). Table 3.6 summarizes
these results. Compared to the base case, a constant and stepwise decreasing net cost of
installation are Pareto superior in the sense that these scenarios incentivize more adopters
than the base case at a lower total budget spent on rebates. A stepwise increasing net cost
incentivizes 27.6% more adopters than the base case, but with an average increased rebate
of 22% per adopter.
As we commented earlier on this section, these rebate schedules are comparable to
the actual rebate schedule. Relatively small changes in these curves have substantial con-
sequences on the number of adopters and the budget spent. Our framework can compute
the consequences of applying particular scenarios beforehand. Using our framework, we can
design and evaluate more sophisticated counterfactuals, such as active rebates that target
specific areas of the city in particular periods to kick start peer effects.
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Narrow range scenario Wide range scenario
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Figure 3.7: Net cost counterfactual. Net cost of installation scenarios, equilibrium adoption,
and budget spent on rebates.
Note: The net cost of installation per kW, ct, is equal to the installation price charged by the installer, pt,
minus the rebate incentive, rt, discounted by the federal incentive tax credit ITCt (which was 30% during
the period of evaluation). Hence, ct = (pt − rt)(1− ITCt).
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3.7.2.2 Rebate Counterfactual
In this counterfactual, we alter the rebate and simulate farther into the future until
Q4-29. The price history available is from Q1-04 until Q4-14. We fit a smooth curve using
locally estimated scatterplot smoothing (LOESS, Cleveland et al. [24]). After the Q4-14
quarter, we assume a constant price equal to the price in Q4-14, which is $2.50 per watt
after ITC. See Figure 3.8 (a1) curve Smooth price.
We compare three rebate scenarios. In Scenario S1, the rebate starts at $3.55 per
watt and decreases at a rate such that the difference between the price and rebate (i.e., the
net cost) is constant at $1.64 per watt (Figure 3.8 (a1)). In Scenario S2, the rebate also
starts at $3.55 per watt and decreases at a rate such that the net cost is constant at $1.64 per
watt. But, in quarter Q1-18, the rebate drops to zero and the net cost increases to $2.491
per watt (Figure 3.8 (b1)). The difference between Scenarios S1 and S2 is the drop of the
rebate to zero in a given quarter. In Scenario S3, the rebate starts at $3.22 per watt and
decreases at a rate such that the net cost is constant at $1.968 per watt. Then, in quarter
Q1-18, the rebate drops to zero and the net cost increases to $2.491 per watt (Figure 3.8
(c1)). The only difference between Scenarios S2 and S3 is the starting value of the rebate.
For these three scenarios, we simulate the diffusion process, and we evaluate the
following four metrics. Metric M1 is the expected cumulative number of adopters. Metric
M2 is the expected cumulative megawatts installed. Metric M3 is the expected cumulative
budget spent on rebates. Metric M4 is the expected budget spent per megawatt installed.
Comparing Scenario S1 and S2 by Metric M1, we observe that the cumulative number
of adopters is higher in Scenario S2 . This may be a surprising result, given that in Scenario
S2, the rebate is lower or equal to the rebate in Scenario S1 in any given quarter. For a
forward-looking household, it is rational to adopt earlier because the rebate will drop in
the future. As a consequence, the peer effects arise sooner than they do in Scenario S1,
motivating even more households to adopt. Subsequently, for Scenario S2, the cumulative
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Scenario S1 Scenario S2 Scenario S3
(a1) (b1) (c1)
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Figure 3.8: Rebate counterfactual. Net cost of installation scenarios, equilibrium adoption,
megawatts installed and budget spent on rebates.
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megawatts (Metric M2) is higher, and cumulative budget spent (Metric M3) is also higher.
Interestingly, the ratio between these two metrics—the budget spent per megawatt installed
(Metric M4)— is lower in Scenario S2. When we compare Scenarios S2 and S3, we observe a
difference in the net cost of ($1.968−$1.64)/$1.64×100 = 20% during the first 14 years (Q1-
04 to Q1-18), which is high enough to deter many households from adopting. The diffusion
process in the long term is almost 30% lower for Scenario S3 when compared to Scenario S2.
3.8 Conclusions
Solar energy will be an essential component of the future energy portfolio. It is a
clean and renewable fuel for generating electricity. However, we are still in an early phase
of the diffusion curve. In order to reach higher levels of penetration, public and private
interventions are necessary to incentivize adoption. To provide insights for policy design, we
developed a diffusion model that takes into consideration the dynamics of decision-making,
economic analysis, and the influence of previous adopters. We have brought together a
unique data set of PV adopters, which allows us to estimate the model at a micro-level of
resolution. We characterized the adopters by income and urbanization level, estimating the
predisposition of potential adopters to install PV given the economic considerations and the
peer effects.
Our estimates reflect that mid- to high-level income households are more keen to
adopt PV, and PV installations that occur nearby have a more significant influence over
potential adopters. The novelty of this research lies in its quantification of the effects of the
dynamic environment on household preferences. Our counterfactual analysis demonstrates
that fixed or decreasing net cost curves incentivize more adopters than the base case at
a lower average rebate per adopter, while increasing the net cost incentivizes many more
adopters but at a higher average rebate per adopter. Our framework can help policymakers
design an optimal rebate schedule that maximizes PV adoption for a given budget level.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Future Research
This dissertation consists of two essays that seek to predict and influence consumer
demand. In the first essay, we designed and implemented an end-to-end solution to scheduling
advertising on linear television. Leading networks in the United States and in India use our
approach, increasing their ad revenue by 3% to 5%. In the second essay, we developed
a structural econometric model to predict solar panel adoption and to design policies to
incentivize their diffusion.
The first essay addresses the problem of allocating ad videos during commercial
breaks. The contracts between the network and advertisers specify that the ads must be
shown to a specific number of viewers from a targeted demographic. An ad can be aired
as many times as necessary until the intended number of viewers is reached. Moreover, the
advertisers and the network both place a series of constraints on the ads.
We formulate the problem as one large-scale stochastic programming model that
impossible to solve in practice. We produce asymptotic results that allow us to use a ratings
point forecast to simplify the stochastic problem into a deterministic model. Still, it is
not possible to solve the complete mathematical programming model with all the associated
constraints in the short amount of time that is available each day (i.e., less than 15 minutes).
For that purpose, we separate the problem into three stages that reduce the computational
time to a few minutes obtaining schedules that are close to the optimal solution. Also, we
designed time series algorithms that produce accurate ratings point forecast.
This essay establishes several avenues for future research. The first avenue is the
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development of a more sophisticated approach to address the uncertainty of the ratings.
One possibility that we have explored is robust optimization that exploits the correlation
between the ratings of different commercial breaks. In practice, the new formulation only
needs a few more constraints that does not add more complexity to the problem.
A second line of research we plan to explore is of machine learning methods and
structural estimation methods to improve the accuracy of the ratings forecasts. For a differ-
ent application, scheduling programs instead of ads, we have implemented gradient boosting
trees algorithms to forecast ratings, thus improving accuracy relative to the time series model
described in Chapter 2. We plan to interpret the resulting trees specify the most important
features of ratings prediction. Understanding these features will improve the allocation of
ads during commercial breaks to target certain demographics.
The disaggregated data that we use to compute ratings are the minute-by-minute
viewership path of each of the household members that compose the Nielsen panel (about
80,000 households). This viewership data set is joined with demographic and geographic
information. We plan to analyze this data set using a structural model inspired by our
second essay. The research question is how to predict future viewership per household and
how this viewership would change if ads and programs air in a different order. Consequently,
networks could gain a better understanding of their viewers and offer a better marketing mix
to advertisers.
Methodologically, no structural estimation method can handle a problem of this size.
A conservative estimation of the panel size is 80,000 agents × 24 hours per day × 365
days per year × 3 years of historical data. This equals 2,102.4 million rows of decisions
with approximately 200 covariates (agents and shows characteristics). That is a very large
dynamic discrete choice (DDC) estimation problem. We must design an estimation method
that can address such a massive problem.
Our second essay investigated the diffusion of residential solar panel (PV) systems.
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PV adoption in the United States is proliferating. According to the Solar Energy Industries
Association PV systems installations showed an average annual growth rate of 50% during
the previous decade. This growth has been propelled by federal and local incentives and the
decline of installation costs, which was approximately 70% during the last decade. However,
these two factors alone cannot explain such exponential growth. We expand on a decade of
research produced by the Energy Systems Transformation Research Group of The University
of Texas at Austin as we develop a DDC model that considers the economic and social
factors that influence the adoption decision. We design a Bayesian estimation method that
allows us to handle heterogeneity gracefully. Our structural parameter estimates inform the
relative importance of the economic factors and social influence on the utility function of
households. Our estimates also allow us to evaluate counterfactual incentive scenarios so
that a policymaker can design the optimal schedule of incentives to maximize a given metric
(e.g., the cumulative number of adopters, pollution savings).
We plan to compare our empirical results with the theoretical work on technology
adoption of Ulu and Smith [76] and Smith and Ulu [69, 70], who studied the optimality
conditions for the time of adoption under functional assumptions. This comparison can lead
to a more refined utility function in future empirical studies. We also plan to investigate
new estimation methods that incorporate the discount factor as a structural parameter. We
followed the traditional approach to guess a reasonable discount factor. But, perhaps, this
factor could be estimated from the data as Abbring and Daljord [1] discuss.
On the methodological front, we intend to extend our estimation method to handle a
more agents, decisions, covariates, and time periods to model other types of dynamic decision
problems in which the evaluation of counterfactual policies have a strategic value. We plan
to combine machine learning and structural econometric techniques to develop faster and





Scheduling Advertising on Television
A.1 Disaggregated Results for August of a Sample Year
This appendix presents the disaggregated data that is used to construct the sum-
mary statistics presented in the essay. Data in Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5 are the
disaggregate data of essay’s Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively.
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Table A.1: Statistics of instances august sample year.
# Breaks # Demos # Advertisers # Brands # Deals # Spots # PCat.
Instance-Day |B| |Q| |A| |K| |D| |U| |P|
8/1 132 16 69 138 98 622 255
8/2 129 18 79 160 121 624 255
8/3 126 18 82 166 133 663 255
8/4 129 19 93 194 155 728 255
8/5 133 18 90 181 152 715 255
8/6 127 17 83 173 109 746 255
8/7 135 18 85 160 118 786 255
8/8 135 18 76 135 100 765 255
8/9 128 16 86 174 129 655 255
8/10 123 14 88 172 138 683 255
8/11 128 14 86 173 127 669 255
8/12 129 14 95 176 152 822 255
8/13 132 12 84 158 113 858 255
8/14 132 13 75 136 100 697 255
8/15 137 13 80 147 106 756 255
8/16 171 18 88 165 128 579 255
8/17 167 18 85 177 132 638 255
8/18 169 16 76 167 117 636 255
8/19 171 15 84 160 126 607 255
8/20 172 16 81 153 112 680 255
8/21 173 16 81 159 113 635 255
8/22 176 15 73 121 93 464 255
8/23 165 17 83 126 129 582 255
8/24 161 17 86 186 143 657 255
8/25 168 16 81 170 129 625 255
8/26 170 18 91 183 144 621 255
8/27 173 15 85 174 124 745 255
8/28 173 16 85 159 115 657 255
8/29 170 16 72 134 97 505 255
8/30 156 21 98 210 162 717 255
8/31 168 20 88 185 142 700 255
Note. Stdev: standard deviation. CV: coefficient of variation (Stdev/mean). PCat: product categories.
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Table A.2: Stage 2 problems size, and MIP gap.
Instance-Day # Binary vars. # Continuous vars. # Constraints MIP gap [%]
8/1 7,248 11,187 20,445 0.82
8/2 8,875 10,502 18,579 1.01
8/3 7,495 9,955 18,022 0.03
8/4 9,865 12,034 21,419 0.02
8/5 11,064 11,971 21,562 0.06
8/6 18,033 18,302 32,181 0.79
8/7 8,560 12,889 23,007 0.62
8/8 10,274 13,947 25,103 0.83
8/9 6,623 9,086 16,451 0.76
8/10 5,428 7,984 14,693 0.74
8/11 9,224 11,723 20,847 0.04
8/12 7,429 10,498 19,016 0.96
8/13 6,845 10,230 19,135 0.99
8/14 7,378 10,322 19,130 1.00
8/15 12,968 16,241 29,659 0.99
8/16 5,106 7,942 14,159 0.28
8/17 12,517 14,297 24,860 0.78
8/18 8,532 10,894 20,022 0.99
8/19 10,669 12,101 21,686 0.08
8/20 21,332 21,495 37,548 1.37
8/21 17,095 17,955 31,709 0.03
8/22 4,176 6,470 12,615 0.98
8/23 2,188 4,728 9,335 0.21
8/24 12,350 14,600 25,657 0.26
8/25 24,694 23,538 39,791 0.12
8/26 20,861 21,196 36,292 0.24
8/27 37,418 32,206 55,563 0.43
8/28 23,462 22,058 38,624 0.32
8/29 6,277 9,256 16,555 0.70
8/30 8,980 11,744 20,954 0.78
8/31 8,512 10,822 19,610 0.48
Note. MIP gap = ((MIP objective function - best LP bound objective function)/best LP bound objective
function)× 100.
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Table A.3: Weighted average ratings (M1) and value by day based on forecast ratings.
M1 Value
Day ORG OPT gain [%] ORG [$] OPT [$] gain [%]
8/1 115,915,000 117,609,000 1.46 1,565,770 1,589,100 1.49
8/2 84,954,200 86,191,100 1.46 1,190,980 1,207,240 1.37
8/3 107,126,000 108,123,000 0.93 1,962,410 1,979,820 0.89
8/4 99,418,400 100,947,000 1.54 1,541,040 1,563,640 1.47
8/5 75,768,000 77,270,100 1.98 1,109,250 1,131,060 1.97
8/6 73,366,900 75,414,800 2.79 1,192,450 1,221,150 2.41
8/7 94,228,400 95,529,900 1.38 1,503,240 1,519,120 1.06
8/8 98,232,000 100,735,000 2.55 1,691,920 1,723,760 1.88
8/9 78,514,900 79,433,600 1.17 1,289,620 1,302,440 0.99
8/10 106,816,000 107,852,000 0.97 1,773,440 1,793,060 1.11
8/11 81,675,700 82,654,400 1.20 1,347,240 1,359,650 0.92
8/12 76,324,400 77,427,200 1.44 1,320,000 1,339,410 1.47
8/13 67,917,900 68,933,900 1.50 1,147,950 1,165,090 1.49
8/14 87,648,000 90,476,000 3.23 1,445,980 1,489,430 3.00
8/15 83,754,100 85,588,900 2.19 1,356,760 1,381,780 1.84
8/16 76,467,100 77,322,700 1.12 1,223,040 1,237,260 1.16
8/17 98,908,900 101,478,000 2.60 1,844,080 1,894,520 2.74
8/18 86,515,300 88,296,800 2.06 1,479,870 1,502,280 1.51
8/19 78,213,600 79,785,100 2.01 1,412,880 1,437,550 1.75
8/20 66,027,300 69,624,400 5.45 1,084,500 1,142,620 5.36
8/21 76,425,900 78,742,200 3.03 1,223,300 1,258,260 2.86
8/22 66,274,700 67,104,600 1.25 1,105,080 1,118,590 1.22
8/23 78,573,000 78,941,700 0.47 1,274,720 1,279,520 0.38
8/24 111,999,000 114,717,000 2.43 2,028,790 2,088,610 2.95
8/25 89,990,800 95,485,200 6.11 1,520,670 1,606,590 5.65
8/26 97,527,000 100,115,000 2.65 1,805,710 1,843,780 2.11
8/27 89,293,200 93,426,700 4.63 1,459,230 1,525,290 4.53
8/28 84,572,300 87,770,200 3.78 1,269,710 1,324,050 4.28
8/29 66,996,400 68,641,000 2.45 1,028,270 1,048,840 2.00
8/30 88,940,200 90,928,100 2.24 1,378,660 1,406,970 2.05
8/31 114,625,000 115,171,000 0.48 2,033,440 2,045,400 0.59
Note. ORG: original schedule. OPT: optimized schedule. gain = ((OPT-ORG)/ORG)× 100. We use a
random scaling factor to maintain confidentiality, but the order of magnitudes correspond to the true values.
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Note. ORG: original schedule. OPT: optimized schedule. We use a random scaling factor to maintain
confidentiality, but the order of magnitudes correspond to the true values.
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Table A.5: Allocated ratings and value by day based on actual ratings.
M1 Value
Day ORG OPT gain [%] ORG [$] OPT [$] gain [%]
8/1 120,469,000 121,577,000 0.92 1,651,300 1,674,730 1.42
8/2 98,553,200 99,305,600 0.76 1,375,570 1,388,250 0.92
8/3 109,442,000 110,609,000 1.07 2,173,350 2,196,640 1.07
8/4 123,849,000 125,280,000 1.16 2,028,000 2,050,400 1.10
8/5 159,841,000 161,165,000 0.83 2,817,310 2,832,800 0.55
8/6 112,041,000 113,524,000 1.32 1,820,170 1,837,830 0.97
8/7 124,519,000 125,322,000 0.64 1,987,650 1,996,780 0.46
8/8 92,648,400 93,947,800 1.40 1,558,510 1,576,390 1.15
8/9 85,535,900 86,291,600 0.88 1,440,120 1,456,780 1.16
8/10 108,325,000 109,629,000 1.20 1,884,040 1,929,940 2.44
8/11 92,348,500 92,280,000 -0.07 1,596,280 1,590,920 -0.34
8/12 135,347,000 137,014,000 1.23 2,661,940 2,693,500 1.19
8/13 90,576,700 91,241,600 0.73 1,547,220 1,552,710 0.35
8/14 89,458,100 91,624,100 2.42 1,483,750 1,520,410 2.47
8/15 84,433,800 84,591,700 0.19 1,377,600 1,380,390 0.20
8/16 94,496,100 94,551,500 0.06 1,464,360 1,473,050 0.59
8/17 121,118,000 122,386,000 1.05 2,317,580 2,354,000 1.57
8/18 109,291,000 111,762,000 2.26 1,940,750 1,978,660 1.95
8/19 140,016,000 140,878,000 0.62 2,754,810 2,781,890 0.98
8/20 89,270,100 94,830,900 6.23 1,459,720 1,542,500 5.67
8/21 71,132,400 73,196,100 2.90 1,166,750 1,191,750 2.14
8/22 71,899,700 72,694,700 1.11 1,211,100 1,225,200 1.16
8/23 93,019,200 93,484,400 0.50 1,559,620 1,567,760 0.52
8/24 94,542,800 94,859,100 0.33 1,739,730 1,748,140 0.48
8/25 95,303,100 101,850,000 6.87 1,726,650 1,821,010 5.46
8/26 151,335,000 154,379,000 2.01 3,118,450 3,141,130 0.73
8/27 105,478,000 106,425,000 0.90 1,697,640 1,708,100 0.62
8/28 98,512,300 102,000,000 3.54 1,522,060 1,578,000 3.68
8/29 74,459,300 75,820,100 1.83 1,159,240 1,165,810 0.57
8/30 110,574,000 112,516,000 1.76 1,827,100 1,836,320 0.50
8/31 139,638,000 139,636,000 0.00 2,530,300 2,527,880 -0.10
Note. ORG: original schedule. OPT: optimized schedule. gain = ((OPT-ORG)/ORG)× 100. We use a
random scaling factor to maintain confidentiality, but the order of magnitudes correspond to the true values.
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Figure A.1: % Lift histogram per move, per day of the week august of sample year
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Figure A.2: % Lift histogram per move, per day of August of sample year
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A.2 Application Screens
(a) Setting of general parameters (b) Definition of instance
(c) Setting of soft constraints (d) Selection of hard constraints screen 1
(e) Selection of hard constraints screen 2 (f) Setting of optimization parameters
Figure A.3: Some screens of decision support system that package scheduling model.
Note. Screen shots of the application user interface (UI). The UI allows the user to define instances, select
hard constraints, set soft constraint parameters, and set other optimization parameters.
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Appendix B



















Figure B.1: Histogram of number of adopters per month in Austin between 2013 and 2013.
Source: Austin Energy.
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(a) N households of households Income
segment/N households per block group.
(b) Correlation adopters per year and












































Figure B.2: Households income segmentation.
Source: Nielsen PRIZM.
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(a) N households of Geography/N households
per block group.
(b) Correlation adopters per year and

















































Figure B.3: Households geographic segmentation.
Source: Claritas PRIZM.
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Figure B.4: Austin Energy service area and census block group division .
Source: Austin Energy.
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(a) Property Market Value. (b) Irradiance.


















































(c) Property Square Feet. (d) Tree Cover Square Feet.


















































(e) Annual estimated system
electricity generation.
















Figure B.5: Density of variables used to create clusters.
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